Review of Convictions and Sentences for Explosive Substances and Anti-Terrorism
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| **"Judgment in Muhammad Asjad v. The State: Review of Convictions and Sentences for Explosive Substances and Anti-Terrorism Violations"** |
عدالت نے اپنے ریمارکس میں یہ کہا کہ:
1. **پراسیکیوشن کی کامیابی:** درخواست گزار کے خلاف دھماکہ خیز مواد کی ملکیت کا ثبوت واضح تھا، اور عدالت نے اس بات کو تسلیم کیا کہ قانون کے تحت دھماکہ خیز مواد کے بغیر کوئی قانونی جواز پیش نہیں کیا گیا، جس کے نتیجے میں دہشت گردی کے مقصد کا مفروضہ قائم ہوتا ہے۔
2. **سزا کی تخفیف:** چونکہ الیکٹرانک سرکٹ کی فعالیت کو ثابت نہیں کیا جا سکا اور درخواست گزار کی کوئی پچھلی مجرمانہ تاریخ نہیں تھی، عدالت نے سزا میں تخفیف کی، یعنی دھماکہ خیز مواد کے قانون کے تحت سزائے قید کو سات سال تک محدود کر دیا اور انسداد دہشت گردی قانون کے تحت سزائے قید کو چودہ سال تک کم کر دیا۔
3. **قانونی تشریح:** عدالت نے یہ بھی وضاحت کی کہ دفعہ 27A ATA کے تحت دھماکہ خیز مواد کی ملکیت کو دہشت گردی کے مقصد کا مفروضہ سمجھا جاتا ہے، مگر مجرمانہ ارادے کی عدم موجودگی کی بنا پر سزا میں تخفیف کی گئی۔
سزا کم کرنے کی وجوہات درج ذیل ہیں:
1. **دھماکہ خیز مواد کا فعال ہونا ثابت نہیں ہوا**: عدالت نے یہ پایا کہ الیکٹرانک سرکٹ کی فعالیت، جو کہ دھماکہ خیز مواد کو فعال کرنے کے لئے استعمال کی جا سکتی تھی، ثابت نہیں ہوئی۔ اس لیے دھماکہ خیز مواد کی مکمل خطرناک صلاحیت کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے مقدمے کی شدت کو کم کیا گیا۔
2. **پہلے کوئی مجرمانہ ریکارڈ نہیں**: درخواست گزار کی پچھلی زندگی میں کوئی مجرمانہ ریکارڈ نہیں تھا، جو کہ سزا میں نرمی کی ایک اہم وجہ بنی۔
3. **پرامن حالات**: درخواست گزار کے مقدمے کی موجودہ صورتحال اور اس کی زندگی کے دیگر حالات کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے سزا میں تخفیف کی گئی۔
یہ عوامل مل کر عدالت کو سزا میں کمی کا فیصلہ کرنے پر مجبور کرتے ہیں، جو کہ درخواست گزار کے لئے کچھ حد تک نرمی پر مشتمل ہے۔
**فیصلہ**
**کیس:** محمد اسجد بمقابلہ ریاست
**سننے کی تاریخ:** 10.07.2024
**ججز:** یحییٰ آفریدی، ج.
**پس منظر:**
محمد اسجد، درخواست گزار، کو دھماکہ خیز مواد کے قانون 1908 کی دفعہ 4 اور انسداد دہشت گردی قانون 1997 کی دفعہ 7 کے تحت سزا سنائی گئی تھی۔ اسجد کے پاس 2.1 کلوگرام دھماکہ خیز مواد اور ایک الیکٹرانک سرکٹ تھا، جس کے نتیجے میں دونوں دفعات پر عمر قید کی سزا سنائی گئی۔ اپیل میں یہ سزا برقرار رہی، جس کے بعد موجودہ درخواست دائر کی گئی۔
**درخواست گزار کے دلائل:**
1. **پروسیکیوشن کے شواہد میں تضاد:** درخواست گزار کا کہنا ہے کہ گواہوں کے بیانات میں تضاد اور بہتری آئی ہے۔
2. **ATA کا اطلاق نہیں:** *غلام حسین بمقابلہ ریاست* کے فیصلے کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے درخواست گزار نے کہا کہ ATA کی دفعات اس کیس پر لاگو نہیں ہوتیں۔
3. **سزاؤں کی شدت:** درخواست گزار کا کہنا ہے کہ سزائیں بہت سخت اور غیر مناسب ہیں۔
**ریاست کے دلائل:**
1. **کیس کا ثابت ہونا:** ریاست کا کہنا ہے کہ کیس کو معقول شک سے بالاتر ثابت کیا گیا ہے۔
2. **ATA کا اطلاق:** ریاست نے کہا کہ ATA کی دفعات خاص طور پر دفعہ 27A کے تحت اس کیس پر لاگو ہوتی ہیں۔
**عدالت کی رائے:**
1. **شواہد اور مفروضہ:**
- درخواست گزار کو دھماکہ خیز مواد کے ساتھ گرفتار کیا گیا جو کہ ڈائنامائٹ تھا، جو کہ دھماکہ خیز مواد کے قانون اور ATA کے دائرہ کار میں آتا ہے۔
- دفعہ 27A ATA کے تحت دھماکہ خیز مواد کی غیر قانونی ملکیت دہشت گردی کے مقصد کی مفروضہ کو جنم دیتی ہے، جسے درخواست گزار نے چیلنج نہیں کیا۔
2. **قانونی تشریح:**
- عدالت نے کہا کہ دھماکہ خیز مواد کی ملکیت دہشت گردی کے مقصد کی مفروضہ کے تحت آتی ہے۔
- *غلام حسین* کیس کے تحت، دفعہ 6(2) کے ساتھ دفعہ 27A کا جائزہ لیا جانا چاہیے۔ یہ مفروضہ بوجھ کو درخواست گزار پر منتقل کرتا ہے۔
3. **دھماکہ خیز مواد کے قانون کے تحت الزامات:**
- دفعہ 4 میں بدنیتی شامل ہوتی ہے، جبکہ دفعہ 5 میں صرف مشکوک حالات میں دھماکہ خیز مواد کی ملکیت پر سزا ہے۔
- چونکہ الیکٹرانک سرکٹ کے دھماکہ خیز مواد سے جڑے ہونے کا کوئی ثبوت نہیں ملا، اس لئے صرف دفعہ 5 لاگو ہوتی ہے۔
**نتیجہ:**
- **مجرم قرار دینا:** درخواست گزار کو دھماکہ خیز مواد کے قانون کی دفعہ 5 کے تحت مجرم قرار دیا گیا۔
- **سزائیں:**
- دفعہ 5 کے تحت سات سال کی سادہ قید۔
- دفعہ 7(l)(ff) کے تحت چودہ سال کی سادہ قید۔
- **حکم:** دونوں سزائیں بیک وقت چلیں گی، اور دفعہ 382-B CrPC کا فائدہ بھی دیا جائے گا۔
**فیصلہ:** درخواست جزوی طور پر منظور کی گئی اور پرانا فیصلہ مذکورہ شرائط کے تحت تبدیل کیا گیا۔
**تاریخ:** اگست 2024
۔
ایف آئی آر نمبر 41، مورخہ 18.09.2015، پولیس اسٹیشن کاؤنٹر ٹیررزم ڈیپارٹمنٹ، لاہور میں درج کی گئی۔ ایف آئی آر کے مطابق، محمد اسجد کو دھماکہ خیز مواد (2.1 کلوگرام) اور ایک الیکٹرانک سرکٹ کے ساتھ گرفتار کیا گیا۔ یہ مواد اور سرکٹ انسداد دہشت گردی اور دھماکہ خیز مواد کے قوانین کی خلاف ورزی کے طور پر دیکھا گیا، جس کے نتیجے میں اس پر دفعات 4/5 دھماکہ خیز مواد کے قانون اور دفعہ 7 انسداد دہشت گردی قانون کے تحت مقدمہ چلایا گیا۔
Asjad
.. .Petitioner
Versus
The State, etc.
.. .Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner:
For the State:
Date of Hearing:
10.07.2024
JUDGMENT
Yahya Afridi. J»- Muhammad
Asjad
(“petitioner”)
was
booked in case FIR No. 41, dated 18.09.2015, registered at Police
Station Counter Terrorism Department, Lahore, for the offences
under Sections 4/5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (“Act”)
and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (“ATA”). He was
alleged to have been found in possession of 2.1 kilograms of
explosive substance and an electric circuit. Following a trial, the
Anti-Terrorism Court-IV, Lahore convicted the Petitioner under
Section 4 of the Act and Section 7(l)(ff) of the ATA, sentencing him
to simple imprisonment for life on each count, to run concurrently
with the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (“CrPC”). The convictions and sentences awarded
Criminal Petition No. 809-L of2017
to the Petitioner were upheld by the High Court in appeal, leading
to the present petition before this Court.
The
learned
2.
submissions highlighted the inconsistencies and improvements in
the statements of prosecution witnesses, which according to him
provisions of the ATA do not apply to this case, in view of the
judgment of this Court rendered in Ghulam Hussain v. State (PLD 2020
SC 61). In addition, he submitted that the prosecution evidence
produced did not suffice to saddle conviction under Section 4 of
the Act. Finally, he asserted that the sentences awarded are harsh
and unduly severe. Conversely, the learned Additional Prosecutor
General, appearing for the State, argued that the prosecution had
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. He further submitted
that the provisions of the ATA are clearly applicable to this case.
particularly in the light of Section 27A of the ATA. He concluded
that the impugned judgment does not warrant interference by this
Court.
We have heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner
3.
and the learned Additional Prosecutor General and have gone
through the record.
The record shows that the Petitioner was apprehended
4.
having in his possession a substantial quantity (2.1 Kilograms) of
material, which
confirmed to be explosive substance, within the contemplation of
the Act and the ATA. The eyewitnesses produced by the
prosecution, who testified the veracity of the said recovery, were
Criminal Petition No. 809-L of2017
public servants having no reason to falsely implicate the Petitioner
in a case of such a grave nature entailing punishment of life
the prosecution
imprisonment.
witnesses were consistent in their statements regarding the safe
custody and transmission of the recovered material in sealed
sample parcel to the Forensic Science Agency. Trace Chemistry
Analysis Report confirmed that the representative sample of the
recovered material sent for forensic analysis was dynamite, a high
explosive. And thereby bringing the case against the Petitioner
within the mischief of the Act and the ATA. More importantly, the
Petitioner failed to provide any lawful justification for having
explosive substance in his possession. He also could not establish
the possibility of his false implication in the case.
Charge and conviction under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997
5.
As to the issue of whether the ATA applies to the
present case when viewed in the light of the interpretation of the
provisions of the ATA, as dilated in the Ghulam Hussain’s case {supra).
In that case, a Seven Member Bench of this Court declared that for
an action or threat of action to be accepted as “terrorism”, within
the meaning of Section 6 of the ATA, two conditions must co-exist:
(i) the action must fall in Section 6(2) of the ATA; and (ii) the use or
threat of such action must be designed to achieve any of the
objectives specified in section 6(l)(b) of the ATA or the use or threat
of such action must be to achieve any of the purposes mentioned
in section 6(l)(c) of the ATA.
The main thrust of the learned counsel for the
6.
Petitioner was that the case of the prosecution lacked the proof of
Criminal Petition No. 809-L of2017
the second condition - the design or purpose stipulated in Section
6(l)(b) or 6(l)(c) of the ATA - rendering the impugned conviction
and sentence under the ATA unsustainable. When confronted with
the above contention, the learned Additional Prosecutor General
drew our attention to Section 27A of the ATA, which he submitted
[supra], to contend
that the provisions of the ATA clearly applied to the present case.
7.
Before we review the legal purport of Section 27A of
the ATA, one must be mindful that the very criminalization of
possessing explosive substance, without lawful justification, as an
under Section 6(2)(ee) of the ATA, and the
insertion of a statutory presumption under Section 27A of the ATA
were introduced through the same piece of legislation, the AntiSpecifically, the phrase "or having any explosive substance without
any lawful justification or having been unlawfully concerned with
such explosive” was added to Section 6(2)(ee) of the ATA by Section
rebuttable presumption of the ‘purpose of terrorism’, was inserted
underscores a clear and deliberate intention to link the possession
of explosives, in the absence of lawful justification, directly to the
rebuttable presumption of the ‘purpose of terrorism’ in Section 27A
of the ATA, the legislature effectively shifted the burden of proof
onto the accused, recognizing the inherent danger and potential for
harm posed by the unauthorized possession of these destructive
materials.
8.
(Emphasis added)
A careful reading of Section 27A of the ATA clearly reveals the
legislative intent to introduce this provision: to deter the illicit
possession of explosive substance and facilitate the prosecution of
explosives-related terrorism offences. And thus, the legislature
introduced a presumption, albeit rebuttable, that possession of
explosive substance, without lawful justification or unlawful
concern, presumes a ‘purpose of terrorism’.
9.
A legal presumption, and that too, in a criminal
enactment having severe penal punishments, must be viewed and
interpreted strictly and with due legal care. For the burden of proof
to shift upon the accused to prove the contrary, the prosecution
must first prove the factum of the accused’s possession of
possession of explosive substance is proved by the prosecution, the
onus would shift upon the accused to prove that the possession of
explosive substance was for lawful justification
purpose. And in absence of any evidence produced by the accused
in justification thereof, it would prove the contrary; an intention
aligned with the requirement of purpose of
stipulated in Section 6(l){c) of the ATA.
10.
would be beneficial to refer to Section 6(3) of the ATA and the
observations made by this Court regarding this provision in the
Ghulam Hussain’s case {supra).
Section 6(3) of the ATA provides:
In the Ghulam Hussain’s case {supra), it was observed that
11.
the provisions of Section 6(3) of the ATA do not piece well with the
remaining provisions of Section 6 of the ATA. It was suggested that
Section 6(3) of the ATA be read down to resolve this conflict.
However, the Court ultimately left this issue unresolved and did
not actually read down the provision. It is important to note that
the examples cited in the Ghulam Hussain’s
the potential conflict between Section 6(3) and the broader
framework of Section 6 of the ATA, primarily relate to actions
involving the use of firearms and other weapons, not explosives.
While the inclusion of firearms and other weapons in Section 6(3)
raises concerns about inconsistency with the rest of Section 6 of
the ATA, the same cannot be said for explosives. Given that the
Court did not provide a conclusive interpretation by reading down
Section 6(3) to clarify the limited meaning of this provision, the
question of how to reconcile Section 6(3) with the remaining
provisions of Section 6 of the ATA remains open, and we do not
find it necessary render a definite finding in the present case.
Criminal Petition No. 809-L of2017
On review of the evidence produced by the parties, we
12.
have found that: the prosecution has been able to prove through
reliable evidence the recovery of the explosive substance from the
direct possession of the petitioner thereby exposing him to the
mischief of Section 27A of the ATA - presumption of a 'purpose of
terrorism’. The failure of the Petitioner to produce any evidence,
possession of explosive substance, shows that he was unable to
rebut the presumption drawn against him. Accordingly, we note
that both the courts below undertook an exhaustive analysis of the
evidence available on the record and concurred in their conclusion
that the guilt of the Petitioner to have committed the offence of
had been proved to the hilt and upon our own independent
evaluation of the evidence, we have not been able to take a view
different from that concurrently taken by the courts below.
Charge and conviction under Explosive Substances Act, 1908
In addition to the charge under the ATA, the Petitioner
13.
three provisions of law - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Section
6(2)(ee) of the ATA - criminalize the act of possessing explosive
substance, though under different circumstances. To appreciate
the subtleties of the said offences, one must understand their
essential ingredients, as provided under the law.
Section 4 of the Act reads:
4. Punishment for attempt to cause explosion, or for making or
keeping explosive with intent to endanger life or property. -
Any person who unlawfully and maliciously
Criminal Petition No. 809-L of2017
Section 5 of the Act provides:
A joint reading of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, clearly sets out that:
the former relates to possession of explosive substance shall be
accompanied with a malicious intent to endanger life or cause
serious injury to property; while the latter, on the other hand.
criminalizes the mere possession of explosive substance, without
there being any condition of the same being with a malicious intent
to endanger life or cause serious injuiy to property. Notably the
difference between Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act lies in
malicious intent.
In the present case, though an electric circuit was
14.
but the
prosecution failed to produce in evidence any ballistic opinion to
5. Punishment for making or possessing explosives under
suspicious circumstances. - Any person who makes or
knowingly has in his possession or under his control any
explosive substance, under such circumstances as to give
rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is not making it or
does not have it in his possession or under his control for
a lawful object, shall, unless he can show that he made it
or had it in his possession or under his control for a
lawful object, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to fourteen years.
Criminal Petition No. 809-L of2017
confirm that the same was functional to trigger an explosive
substance. This being so, the prosecution has not been able to
establish that the Petitioner had a malicious intent to endanger life
or cause serious injury to property. Therefore, Section 4 of the Act
is not applicable and attracted in the circumstances of the present
case against the Petitioner, and he could only be convicted for
possessing the explosive substance under Section 5 of the Act.
15.
suspicious circumstances and he could not show that he was in
possession of explosive substance for a lawful object, the offence
under Section 5 of the Act stands established. We, therefore,
convict the Petitioner under Section 5 of the Act.
Quantum ofsentence
16.
Turning to the quantum of sentence to be awarded to
the Petitioner for committing the offences under ATA and the Act,
we must take into consideration that the prosecution has been
able to establish only recovery of the explosive substance without
any live electric circuit from the direct possession of the Petitioner,
while he was present at a road junction, and that too, coupled with
the fact that the Petitioner lacks any prior criminal history. These
are mitigating circumstances that warrant reduced sentences.
Conclusion
Accordingly,
the
Petitioner
17.
convict
for
the
we
commission of the offence under Section 5 of the Act, and award
him simple imprisonment for seven years under Section 5 of the
Criminal Petition No. 809~L of2017
10
»
Act; and while upholding his conviction under Section 7(l)(ff) of the
ATA, we exercise our discretion to reduce the sentence of simple
imprisonment for life awarded to simple imprisonment for fourteen
years under Section 7(l)(ff) of the ATA. Both the sentences shall
run concurrently and the benefit of Section 382-B of the CrPC
shall also be granted. The petition is converted into appeal, the
impugned judgment is modified in the above terms and the appeal
is partly allowed, accordingly.
..2024.
Approved for reporting.
Announced in Open Court on n.i•r
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