Punishment for violation of section 144 crpc | dafa 144 in Pakistan means,kia hai , khalaf warzi per kitni punishment hu gi،kab or kese lagai ja ja sakti hai.
How to enforce section 144 |
"Dafa 144" is a term used in Pakistan to refer to Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. When authorities impose Dafa 144, it means that they are prohibiting the assembly of a certain number of people in a specific area to maintain public order and prevent disturbances. Dafa 144 meaning in Urdu "Dafa 144" ایک اصطلاح ہے جو پاکستان میں ضابطہ فوجداری کی دفعہ 144 کے لیے استعمال ہوتی ہے۔ جب حکام دفا 144 نافذ کرتے ہیں، تو اس کا مطلب یہ ہوتا ہے کہ وہ امن عامہ کو برقرار رکھنے اور خلل کو روکنے کے لیے مخصوص علاقے میں لوگوں کی ایک خاص تعداد کے جمع ہونے پر پابندی لگا رہے ہیں۔ |
144 or section 144 |
Aksar dekha gia hai ke dafa. 144 ka nafaz kia jata hai magar humare logo ke zahan ma swalat uthte hain ke ye section kia hai , kab or kio lagai jati hai.
Saza kia hu gi .agar koi banda section 144 ki khalaf warzi karta hai.
Section 144 ki khalaf warzi per 6 month qaid or jurmana ki saza hu sakti ha. Under section 188 ppc
144 section or 188 section parhain iss post ke end per.
Court marriage procedure
- Pehla ikhtyar District magistrate kisi khatre ki soorat ma order kar sakta ha
- Is ke ilawa,District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, (or of any other Executive Magistrate] specially empowered by the Provincial Government
- Kab kar sakta jab hangami soorat haal hu.
- Kitni dair tak hu sakta 2 mah tak
- Subsection 6 ) اس دفعہ کے تحت کوئی حکم اس کے بننے سے دو ماہ سے زیادہ نافذ نہیں رہے گا،بشرطیکہ انسانی جان، صحت یا حفاظت کے لیے خطرے کی صورت میں، یا کسی فساد یا جھگڑے کے امکان کی صورت میں،صوبائی حکومت، سرکاری گزٹ میں نوٹیفکیشن کے ذریعے، بصورت دیگر ہدایت کرتی ہے۔
- Aaj kal yeh dafa DCO bhi nafaz kar raha hai.
- Mansookh or tabdili order main kese hugi
- 4) کوئی بھی مجسٹریٹ، اپنی تحریک پر یا کسی بھی متاثرہ شخص کی درخواست پر، منسوخ کر سکتا ہے یااس سیکشن کے تحت خود یا دفتر میں اپنے پیشرو کی طرف سے بنائے گئے کسی حکم کو تبدیل کر
- ۔magistrate kia kre ga agar application aati hai tu
- جہاں ایسی درخواست موصول ہوتی ہے، مجسٹریٹ درخواست گزار کو جلد از جلد موقع فراہم کرے گا۔اس کے سامنے ذاتی طور پر یا وکیل کے ذریعہ پیش ہونا اور حکم کے خلاف وجہ ظاہر کرنا؛ اور، اگرمجسٹریٹ درخواست کو مکمل یا جزوی طور پر مسترد کرتا ہے، وہ ایسا کرنے کی اپنی وجوہات تحریری طور پر ریکارڈ کرے گا
- Iss. Ke Ilawa aap in order under section 144 Crpc ko High court main bhi challenge kar sakte hai
- Iss post ke aakhar per peshawar high court ki judgement main share ki gai hai. Jiss main dafa 144 ko High court main challenge kia gia or High court ne dafa 144 khatam kar di. Kionke darkhasat guzar ne moqaf ikhtiyar kia tha ke dafa 144 in ka scrape ka business band karne ke liye nafaz ki gai thi High court ne qarar dia ke karobar karna har farad ka fundamental right hai ju constitution of Pakistan ne dia hai or magistrate ke order ko ghair qanooni qarar de dia.
- Umeed hai ke section 144 aap ko samajh aa gia hu ga
- High Court ki judgment post ke end per lagi hai.
case laws on section 144 crpc Pakistan
8. **Muhammad Ashraf vs. The State (2005)**: In this case, the Lahore High Court emphasized that the power conferred by Section 144 CRPC should be exercised cautiously and only when there is an urgent necessity to prevent a disturbance of public tranquility. [LHC 2005 Lahore 1018]
9. **Munir Ahmed vs. The State (2012)**: The Islamabad High Court in this case reiterated that the imposition of Section 144 CRPC should be backed by tangible evidence demonstrating an imminent threat to public order. The court highlighted the need for the Executive Magistrate to assess the situation objectively before issuing such orders. [2012 CLC 1428]
10. **Mst. Farzana Bibi vs. The State (2016)**: In this case, the Peshawar High Court emphasized that the restrictions imposed under Section 144 CRPC should be time-bound and reviewed periodically to ensure their continued necessity. The court stressed that such orders should not be open-ended and must be lifted once the situation returns to normalcy. [2016 PLD Peshawar 92]
1. **Ghulam Qadir vs. The State (2010)**: In this case, the Lahore High Court discussed the scope and applicability of Section 144 CRPC. The court emphasized that the power under Section 144 should be exercised cautiously and only in situations where immediate action is required to prevent imminent danger to public peace and safety.
2. **Zahid Hussain vs. The State (2007)**: The Islamabad High Court in this case reiterated that the power to issue orders under Section 144 CRPC should be exercised sparingly and only when there is a clear and present danger to public peace and tranquility. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that the restrictions imposed under Section 144 are proportionate to the situation at hand.
3. **Shahid Mahmood vs. The State (2013)**: In this case, the Lahore High Court emphasized that orders issued under Section 144 CRPC must be specific, clear, and unambiguous. The court highlighted the importance of ensuring that the rights of individuals are not unduly curtailed by arbitrary or vague orders issued under Section 144.
4. **Mst. Abida Shaheen vs. The State (2009)**: The Peshawar High Court in this case emphasized that orders issued under Section 144 CRPC must be based on credible and reliable information indicating a genuine threat to public peace and safety. The court underscored the need for the Executive Magistrate to exercise discretion judiciously and to provide sufficient justification for imposing restrictions under Section 144.
5. **Muhammad Iqbal Khan vs. The State (2008)**: In this case, the Lahore High Court emphasized that the power to issue orders under Section 144 CRPC should be exercised by the Executive Magistrate himself and cannot be delegated to subordinate officers except in exceptional circumstances. The court highlighted the importance of ensuring that the orders are issued by competent authorities and are not arbitrary.
6. **Mukhtiar Ahmed vs. The State (2015)**: The Sindh High Court in this case discussed the necessity of providing an opportunity for affected parties to be heard before imposing restrictions under Section 144 CRPC. The court emphasized the principles of natural justice and due process, highlighting that individuals affected by the orders should have the opportunity to present their case before the Executive Magistrate.
7. **Mst. Shahnaz Begum vs. The State (2011)**: In this case, the Peshawar High Court reiterated that orders issued under Section 144 CRPC must be based on objective criteria and credible evidence of potential harm to public peace and safety. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that the restrictions imposed under Section 144 are reasonable, proportionate, and necessary in the circumstances.
Dafa 144
CHAPTER XI - TEMPORARY ORDERS IN URGENT CASES OF NUISANCE OR
APPREHENDED DANGER
144. Power to issue order absolute at once in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. in
cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, (or of any other Executive
Magistrate] specially empowered by the Provincial Government or the District Magistrate to act under this
section, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy
remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and
served in manner provided by section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain
order with certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that
such direction Is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of
obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or
safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, or an affray.
(2) An order under this section may. in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not
admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed,
exparte.
(3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to the public generally when
frequenting or visiting a particular place.
(4) Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or
alter any order made under this section by himself or by his predecessor in office.
(5) Where such an application is received, the Magistrate shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity
of appearing before him either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order; and, if the
Magistrate rejects the application wholly or in part, he shall record in writing his reasons for so doing
(6) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof,
unless, in cases of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the
Provincial Government, by notification in the official Gazette, otherwise directs.
Dafa 144 in Urdu.
144. پریشانی یا خطرے کی فوری صورت میں فوری طور پر حکم جاری کرنے کا اختیار۔ میں
ایسے معاملات جہاں، ڈسٹرکٹ مجسٹریٹ، سب ڈویژنل مجسٹریٹ، (یا کسی دوسرے ایگزیکٹو کی رائے میں)
مجسٹریٹ] خصوصی طور پر صوبائی حکومت یا ڈسٹرکٹ مجسٹریٹ کی طرف سے اس کے تحت کارروائی کرنے کا اختیار دیا گیا ہے۔
سیکشن، اس سیکشن کے تحت آگے بڑھنے اور فوری روک تھام یا تیز رفتاری کے لیے کافی زمین موجود ہے۔
علاج مطلوب ہے، ایسا مجسٹریٹ ایک تحریری حکم کے ذریعے کیس کے مادی حقائق بیان کر سکتا ہے اور
سیکشن 134 کے ذریعہ فراہم کردہ طریقے سے پیش کیا جاتا ہے، کسی بھی شخص کو کسی خاص عمل سے پرہیز کرنے یا کچھ لینے کی ہدایت کرتا ہے۔
اس کے قبضے میں یا اس کے زیر انتظام کچھ جائیداد کے ساتھ حکم دیں، اگر ایسا مجسٹریٹ اس پر غور کرے۔
اس طرح کی سمت کو روکنے کا امکان ہے، یا روکنے کا رجحان ہے، رکاوٹ، جھنجھلاہٹ یا چوٹ، یا خطرہ
قانونی طور پر ملازمت کرنے والے کسی بھی شخص کے لیے رکاوٹ، جھنجھلاہٹ یا چوٹ، یا انسانی زندگی، صحت یا کو خطرہ
حفاظت، یا عوامی سکون میں خلل، یا فساد، یا جھگڑا۔
(2) اس دفعہ کے تحت ایک حکم ہو سکتا ہے۔ ہنگامی حالات میں یا ایسے معاملات میں جہاں حالات نہیں ہوتے
اس شخص پر نوٹس کے مقررہ وقت میں پیش کرنے کا اعتراف جس کے خلاف حکم دیا گیا ہے، منظور کیا جائے،
چھوڑنا
(3) اس دفعہ کے تحت ایک حکم کسی خاص فرد کو، یا عام طور پر عوام کو دیا جا سکتا ہے جب
کثرت سے جانا یا کسی خاص جگہ پر جانا۔
(4) کوئی بھی مجسٹریٹ، یا تو اپنی تحریک پر یا کسی بھی متاثرہ شخص کی درخواست پر، منسوخ کر سکتا ہے یا
اس سیکشن کے تحت خود یا دفتر میں اپنے پیشرو کی طرف سے بنائے گئے کسی حکم کو تبدیل کریں۔
(5) جہاں ایسی درخواست موصول ہوتی ہے، مجسٹریٹ درخواست گزار کو جلد از جلد موقع فراہم کرے گا۔
اس کے سامنے ذاتی طور پر یا وکیل کے ذریعہ پیش ہونا اور حکم کے خلاف وجہ ظاہر کرنا؛ اور، اگر
مجسٹریٹ درخواست کو مکمل یا جزوی طور پر مسترد کرتا ہے، وہ ایسا کرنے کی اپنی وجوہات تحریری طور پر ریکارڈ کرے گا۔
(6) اس دفعہ کے تحت کوئی حکم اس کے بننے سے دو ماہ سے زیادہ نافذ نہیں رہے گا،
بشرطیکہ انسانی جان، صحت یا حفاظت کے لیے خطرے کی صورت میں، یا کسی فساد یا جھگڑے کے امکان کی صورت میں،
صوبائی حکومت، سرکاری گزٹ میں نوٹیفکیشن کے ذریعے، بصورت دیگر ہدایت کرتی ہے۔
JUDGMENT SHEET
IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,
MINGORA BENCH (DAR-UL-QAZA), SWAT
(Judicial Department)
W.P No. 587-M/2014
JUDGMENT
Date of hearing:
09.2.2016
Petitioners: (Muhammad Inam and others) by
Muhammad Arshad Yousafzai, Adv.
Respondents: (Deputy Commissioner Swat &
others) by Mr. Sabir Shah, A.A.G.
HAIDER ALI KHAN, J.- Through this single
judgment we intend to decide the instant writ
petition i.e W.P No. 587-M/2014 as well as the
connected petitions bearing W.P Nos. 599-M/2014
and 118-M/2015 as common questions of law and
facts are involved in all these petitions.
2. The petitioners herein have prayed for
the following relief.
“It is, therefore, requested to
declare the impugned order
No. 882/15/Juddl;/Vol-1 dated
12.11.2014 passed by Respondent
No.1 and Memo No. 5172-
78/77/C/Vol-3 dated 10.11.2014
issued by Respondent No.2
through secretary, null and void,
against the constitutional, illegal,
wrong and against the principles of
Sharia”.
3. In essence, the petitioners are carrying
on the business of sale and purchase of old parts of
vehicles/scrape automobile parts which has been
banned through the impugned orders, mentioned
above in the prayer, in exercise of the powers
under section 144, Cr.P.C, by the District
Magistrate, Swat. Being aggrieved, the petitioners
have moved these writ petitions before this Court.
4. Arguments heard, record perused and
comments submitted by the respondents were gone
through.
5. During the course of arguments, the
attention of this Court was brought towards a letter
of the Commissioner, Malakand Division, bearing
No. 2532-38 /77/C/V-2 dated 05.6.2014 wherein
the present matter has been discussed in detail the
relevant Paras whereof are reproduced herein
below for the sake of convenience.
“3. The genuine focus and scope of
Section 144 of Cr.P.C is
essentially for dealing with a
situation where a law & order or
breach of peace and tranquillity is
in the oftening. In the instant case
the imposition of section 144 of
the Cr.P.C does not seem justified
for the purpose of law & order.
Instead of section 144 the district
administrations are required to
submit recommendations for
consideration and subsequent
decision by the competent
authority at the provincial and
federal level and the same
decisions are then to be
implemented accordingly at the
district level. This may include
proposals for regulating the NCP
vehicles and reservations of the
stakeholders on the business of
scrap parts, which is not restricted
to Malakand Division only and the
parts are cleared by the custom
authorities after import and its
transportation to other parts of the
country is allowed by FBR.
4. I am further to add that the issue
has been thoroughly deliberated at
the forum of Malakand Division
Task Force time and again. In this
regard the letter of Deputy
Commissioner Malakand bearing
No. 2554/PS/DC/Malakand, dated
28.3.2014 (copy enclosed) to
Secretary Law Department for
advice and its reply received from
the Law Department vide letter
No. SO(OP-II)/LD/15-1/2012-VolIII, dated 03.4.2014 (copy
enclosed) provides a guideline to
the district administration. The
mentioned communiqué reflects
that Custom Act, 1969 was
repealed in respect of PATA
(Malakand Division) on 7th
August, 1975 vide PATA,
Application of Laws (III
Regulation of 1975). The Law
Department has further clarified
that even if the Custom Act is
extended to Malakand Division it
would be in the domain of custom
authorities and the Excise &
Taxation Department and not the
district administration to
compound NCP vehicles.
5. Similarly the imposition of
section 144 of the Cr.P.C and
compounding of scrap parts, which
have been allowed by the FBR in a
proper way after payment of
government dues at the time of
import from the international
market is also unwarranted rather
unjustified. However, the
reassembling of vehicles at local
level from these parts is illegal and
should be handled in a proper
manner. For that matter the
imposition of section 144 is not a
suitable option.
6. I am further directed to request
you to withdraw the imposed
section 144 of the Cr.P.C upon the
NCP vehicles and business of
scrap parts with immediate effect
in your district and furnish a
compliance report for perusal of
the competent authority at the
earliest because in the absence of
Tax Laws/Custom Act this can
create legal implications for the
civil administration. As far as the
issues of manufacturing of
vehicles from scrap parts as well
as that of stolen cars are
concerned, this may be dealt with
according to the relevant sections
of existing laws in Malakand
Division. For security aspect the
police and other LEAs are at
liberty to check such vehicles and
search them thoroughly and allow
them after security clearance. The
security agencies may further carry
out checking of the vehicles
carrying scrap parts to ascertain
the presence of arms, ammunition
and explosive etc. and apprehend
the culprits if someone use this as
source for the purpose to endanger
the peace and tranquillity of the
area. Such consignments can be
withheld only for cogent reason
and in this regard action be taken
according to relevant sections of
law by the police & LEAs
accordingly, please”.
The above cited contents of the letter
issued by the Commissioner, Malakand Division
(Respondent No.2) need no reiteration by this
Court in holding that the respondents are passing
the recurring orders under the garb of security
measures and thereby harass the petitioners not to
carry on the lawful scrap business in the area. We
are unable to understand that in what manner a ban
on the scrap/cut vehicles can mitigate the security
related issues which aspect has been highlighted
time and again by the District Magistrate in the
impugned order dated 12.11.2014 and the
repeatedly issued similar orders. Even in his
comments the District Magistrate has branded the
same business as “anti-state activities”. Certainly,
the petitioners are dealing in scrape
automobiles/parts thereof which are shifted to
Peshawar on payment of the requisite government
dues but in this region the same business is banned
by the respondents through recurring orders on the
pretext of law and order situation which is in
violation of various Articles of the Constitution as
well as policy of the Provincial Government.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners
also brought our attention towards amendment in
Section 144, Cr.P.C by Ordi. XXXVII of 2001,
PLD 2002 Cent. St.92 by virtue whereof the
powers under the ibid section can only be
exercised by the Zilla Nazim, however, in case the
District Government is not functional then Subsection 7 to Section 144 will operate which is
reproduced herein below:
“(7) In the application of subsection (1) to (6) to the districts
where the local Government
elections have not been held, or the
Zila Nazim has not assumed
charge of office, any reference in
those provisions to the Zila Nazim
shall be read as reference to the
District Coordination Officer in
relation to such districts:”
The above sub-section manifestly say
that the District Coordination Officer now Deputy
Commissioner with powers of District Magistrate
can exercise the powers under Section 144, Cr.P.C
only when elections for the local Government have
not been held or the Local Government is not
functional. The sub-section 7 of the ibid section
will lose its effect when the local Government is
functional in the district as presently the local
governments are functioning in Swat and other
districts of the province. Withdrawal of the same
authority from the Deputy Commissioner is clear
from the proviso to Section 144 (7), Cr.P.C which
reads as under:
“Provided that this sub-section
shall cease to have effect and shall
be deemed to have been repealed,
at the time when local Government
are installed in the district as
aforesaid.”
In view of the above provisions of the
relevant law, the impugned orders as well as orders
of the like nature repeatedly issued by the District
Magistrate, Swat, are beyond the scope of his
lawful authority and as such, the same have no
legal effect.
7. Now coming to the point raised by the
learned A.A.G. that life duration of the impugned
orders has already expired and the fresh order of
the District Magistrate, Swat, which is still in field,
has not been challenged through these writ
petitions. No doubt, the fresh order issued by the
District Magistrate, Swat, is not impugned in this
petition but copies of the same are available in the
connected petitions, however, orders of the same
nature have already been passed by the
respondents in the past and it appears that the same
practice will continue in future as well, therefore,
the issue needs to be resolved once and for all. In
this context it is pertinent to mention here that
earlier a writ petition of the same nature bearing
W.P No. 155-M/2014 had been instituted which
stood dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated
24.4.2014 with the following observations of this
Court.
“In wake of the above, the instant
petition is dismissed as withdrawn,
however, the respondents are
directed not to harass the
petitioners and they be dealt with
in accordance with law”.
Despite the above directions of this
Court, it seems that the Respondent No.1 is
adamant to issue recurring orders of the like nature
for which he has no legal authority. It is noticeable
that orders of the same nature are being issued for
a period of two months and on expiry thereof the
same orders are again renewed in violation of subsection 6 of Section 144, Cr.P.C. as the subsequent
orders are in fact the continuation of the former
ones for which the District Magistrate possesses no
legal authority. Even in cases of danger to human
life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an
affray, as laid down under sub-section 6 of section
144, Cr.P.C, only the Provincial Government is
authorized to issue directions by notification in the
official Gazette and the District Magistrate has no
power to pass orders of the same nature after
expiry of the former two months period. Reliance
is placed on 1984 P.Cr.L.J (Lahore) 1021 and
2003 YLR 893.
8. It is also observed that the
Commissioner, Malakand Division, has realized
the legal repercussions of the orders issued by the
District Magistrate, Swat, in exercise of his powers
under Section 144, Cr.P.C and directed all the
Deputy Commissioners of Malakand Division for
withdrawal of the same orders vide letter
No. 2532-38/77/C/V-2, the relevant paras whereof
have already been reproduced earlier in this
judgment, therefore, despite clear cut directions of
the higher authority, repetition of the earlier orders
by the District Magistrate is not understandable.
Obviously, the impugned orders as well as orders
of the like nature whether in the field or to be
issued in future, are adversely affecting the lawful
scrap business of the petitioners and would amount
to infringement of their right to life as well as of
their families. As observed by the august Supreme
Court of Pakistan in a judgment reported as PLD
1997 Supreme Court 342 that the citizens of
Pakistan are enjoying equality before the law and
freedom of trade, business or professions as
enshrined in Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. State
functionaries are expected to act fairly and justly in
a manner which should not give to any one any
cause of complaint on account of discriminatory
treatment or otherwise and while discharging
official functions, efforts should be made by State
functionaries to ensure that no one is denied the
right to earn his livelihood because of the unfair or
discriminatory act on their part. No doubt, the
petitioners and the people of the area involved in
the same business have not been treated in
accordance with law and the exercise of powers by
the District Magistrate under the garb of Section
144, Cr.P.C in the manner as complained of by the
petitioners can in no way be deemed as fair and
just being discriminatory in nature.
9.
Bare reading of the impugned
notification suggests that the respondents and the
security/intelligence agencies as referred to
therein, instead of improving their own working,
are resorting to the abuse of executive/
administrative authority in the disadvantage and
detriment of the fellow citizens.
10. In view of the above discussion, the
orders impugned through these writ petitions as
well as the orders of the like nature in the field
issued by the respondents are unlawful, capricious,
whimsical and arbitrary, hence, the same have no
legal effect. Therefore, the instant writ petition i.e
W.P No. 587-M/2014 and the connected petitions
bearing W.P Nos. 599-M/2014 and 118-M/2015
are allowed and the orders of the respondents
14
gt}tÅâÄ/PS*
[W.P No. 587-M of 2014 Muhammad Inam and others Vs. Deputy Commissioner Swat and others]
either impugned through these writ petitions or
orders of the like nature still in the field are hereby
set aside. Needless to mention here that the
respondents shall not harass the petitioners and the
public viz-a-viz their lawful business of the like
nature. C.M No. 963-M/2014 is hereby dismissed
for having become infructuous.
Announced.
Dt: 09.2.2016
JUDGE
JUDGE
Section Dafa 144 Crpc
TEMPORARY ORDERS IN URGENT CASES OF NUINANCE OR
APPREHANDED DANGER
144. Power to issue order absolute at once in urgent cases of nuisance or
apprehended danger: (1) in cases where, in the opinion of [the Zila Nazim upon the
written recommendation of the District Superintendent of Police or Executive District
Officer] there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate
prevention or speedy remedy is desirable.
[the Zila Nazim] may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in
manner provided by Section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or take
certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, if such
Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent,
obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person
lawfully employed, or clanger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public
tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray.
(2) An order under this section may, in case of emergency or In cases where the
circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against
whom the order is directed, be passed, exparte.
(3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to the public
generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place.
(4) [The Zila Nazim] may, either, on his own motion or on the application of any person
aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section by himself or by his
predecessor-in-office.
(5) Where such an application is received, the Magistrate shall afford to the applicant an
early opportunity of appearing before him either in person or by pleader and showing
cause against the order; and, if the [Zila Nazim] rejects the application wholly or in part, he
shall record in writing his reasons for so doing.
(6) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two 39[consecutive
days and not more than seven days in a month] from the making thereof; unless, in cases
of danger to human life, health or safety, or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the Provincial
Government, by notification in the official Gazette, otherwise directs.
[(7) In the application of sub-sections (1) to (6) to the districts where the local Government
elections have not been held, or the Zila Nazim has not assumed charge of office, any
reference in those provisions to the Zila Nazim shall be read as a reference to the District
Coordination Officer in relation to such districts:
Provided that this sub-section shall cease to have effect, and shall be deemed to have
been repealed, at the time when local Governments are installed in the districts as
aforesaid.]
Subs. by Ordinance. XXXVII of 2001, dt. 13-8-2001.
Sub-section (7) 2 Proviso added by Ordinance, XLMI of 2001, . dt. 29-8-2001.
Section 188 PPC
property not intending to perform the obligations under which he lays himself by such bidding, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which
may extend to 1[six hundred rupees], or with both.
186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.__ 2[(1)] Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imp
risonment of
either description for a term which may extend to 2[one year], or with fine which may extend to 2[fifty
thousand] rupees, or with both.
2["(2) Whoiever intentionally hampers, misleads, jeopardizes or defeats an investigation, inquiry or
prosecution or issues a false or defective report in a case under any law for the time being in force shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend ot three years or with fine or with both."]
187. Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give assistance. Whoever, being bound
by law to render or furnish assistance to any public servant in the execution of his public duty, intentionally
omits to give such assistance, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to 1[six hundred rupees], or with both ;
and if such assistance be demanded of him by a public servant legally competent to make such demand for
the purposes of executing any process lawfully issued by a Court of Justice, or of preventing the commission
of an offence, or of suppressing a riot, or affray, or of apprehending a person charged with or guilty of an
offence, or of having escaped from lawful custody, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to 1[one thousand five hundred rupees], or with
both.
188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant. Whoever, knowing that, by an order
promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a
certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys
such direction,
shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction,
annoyance or injury, to any persons lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to 1[six hundred rupees], or with both ;
and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends
to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to six months, or with fine which may extend to 1[three thousand rupees], or with both.
Explanation.__ It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his
disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that
his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm.
Illustration
An order is promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, directing that a
religious procession shall not pass down a certain street. A knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes
danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section
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