Inheritance | after withdrawn first suit 2nd suit is barred.
جسٹس عمر عطا بندیال نے کہا کہ محمد نواز کی درخواست کی غیر مشروط واپسی نے اس کی تمام دعووں کو ختم کر دیا، اور نئی درخواست Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC کے تحت بار ہو چکی ہے۔
اس مقدمے میں پاکستان کے سپریم کورٹ نے فیصلہ کیا کہ اپیل کنندگان کی درخواست، جو کہ محمد نواز کے وارث ہیں، کیا پہلے کی گئی درخواست کی غیر مشروط واپسی کی وجہ سے Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC کے تحت پابند ہے۔ اپیل کنندگان نے 2000 میں ایک نیا مقدمہ دائر کیا تھا، جس میں انہوں نے 1951 میں ریکارڈ شدہ وراثت کے مُوٹیشن کو چیلنج کیا تھا۔ اس مُوٹیشن کو پہلے 1957 میں محمد نواز کے ذریعہ چیلنج کیا گیا تھا، اور اس مقدمے کو بغیر کسی شرط کے واپس لے لیا گیا تھا۔
اہم نکات درج ذیل ہیں:
1. **پہلی واپسی اور مُوٹیشن**: محمد نواز نے 1957 میں اپنا مقدمہ بغیر کسی شرط کے واپس لے لیا تھا۔ مُوٹیشن کے خلاف چالیس سال تک کوئی اعتراض نہیں کیا گیا، جس سے ظاہر ہوتا ہے کہ واپسی اور مُوٹیشن کو تسلیم کر لیا گیا تھا۔
2. **اپیل کنندگان کی نئی درخواست**: اپیل کنندگان نے 2000 میں نیا مقدمہ دائر کیا، جو اسی دعویٰ پر مبنی تھا۔ مدعا علیہان نے اعتراض کیا کہ یہ مقدمہ Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC کے تحت بار ہو چکا ہے۔
3. **عدالت کا فیصلہ**: ٹرائل کورٹ نے مقدمہ کو بار اور وقت گزرنے کی بنیاد پر مسترد کر دیا۔ اپیلٹ کورٹ نے مقدمہ کو دوبارہ گواہی کے لیے واپس بھیجا، لیکن ہائی کورٹ نے اس فیصلے کو کالعدم قرار دے دیا۔ سپریم کورٹ نے ہائی کورٹ کے فیصلے کی تائید کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ اپیل کنندگان کی درخواست قانونی طور پر بار ہو چکی ہے۔
4. **قانونی اصول**: عدالت نے یہ بات واضح کی کہ بغیر کسی شرط کے واپس لی گئی درخواست کے تحت نیا مقدمہ دائر نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ نیز، محمد نواز کی خاموشی اور عدم عمل اس بات کی تصدیق کرتی ہے کہ انہوں نے مُوٹیشن سے کوئی اختلاف نہیں کیا۔
یہ مقدمہ مسترد کر دیا گیا اور سپریم کورٹ نے اصولی طور پر یہ واضح کیا کہ پہلے کی واپسی کی وجہ سے نیا مقدمہ دائر نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔
سپریم کورٹ کے جج جسٹس عمر عطا بندیال نے اپنے فیصلے میں درج ذیل اہم نکات اور ریمارکس دیے:
1. **پہلی درخواست کی واپسی**: جسٹس بندیال نے بیان کیا کہ 30 جنوری 1957 کو محمد نواز نے اپنی درخواست کو بغیر کسی شرط کے واپس لے لیا تھا، جس کی وجہ سے نئی درخواست کے دائر ہونے پر پابندی ہے۔ اس واپسی کے ساتھ ہی مقدمہ کو ختم کر دیا گیا تھا اور کوئی نئی درخواست اسی بنیاد پر نہیں دائر کی جا سکتی۔
2. **معاہدے کی عدم تصدیق**: عدالت نے اشارہ دیا کہ محمد نواز کی جانب سے اس وقت کے معاہدے کے بارے میں کوئی واضح معلومات نہیں دی گئیں اور نہ ہی معاہدے کی شرائط ریکارڈ پر تھیں۔ اس لئے اس معاہدے کے مطالبے کی کوئی قانونی حیثیت نہیں بنتی۔
3. **سابقہ مقدمے کا اثر**: عدالت نے یہ بھی کہا کہ اگرچہ اپیل کنندگان نے اپنے دعویٰ میں معاہدے کا ذکر کیا، لیکن محمد نواز نے اس کے خلاف کوئی قانونی کارروائی نہیں کی اور چالیس سال تک مُوٹیشن پر کوئی اعتراض نہیں کیا، جس سے واضح ہوتا ہے کہ مُوٹیشن اس معاہدے کے مطابق تھی۔
4. **پرانے مقدمے پر توجہ**: عدالت نے اس بات پر بھی زور دیا کہ پرانے مقدمے کی واپسی اور اُس پر عمل درآمد کے بغیر نئی درخواست کا دائر ہونا قانونی طور پر درست نہیں ہے۔ سابقہ مقدمے کی واپسی کے بعد نئی درخواست دائر کرنا Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC کی خلاف ورزی ہے۔
یہ ریمارکس اور فیصلے اس بات پر مبنی ہیں کہ اپیل کنندگان کی درخواست پر پہلے ہی فیصلے ہو چکے تھے اور نئے مقدمے کی کوئی قانونی بنیاد نہیں تھی۔
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
Present
Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial
Mr. Justice Manzoor Ahmad Malik
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 446 OF 2012
(On appeal from the judgment dated 16.03.2012 passed by
Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in C.R.324/2003)
Ghulam Abbas & others
…
…
Appellants.
Versus
Mohammad Shafi (decd) thr. LRs & others …
Respondents.
For the appellants
:
Mr. Gulzarin Kiani, Sr. ASC.
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR.
For the respondents
:
Mr. Muhammad Amir Butt, ASC.
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.
Date of hearing
:
20.04.2016.
JUDGMENT
UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J. – The impugned judgment dated
16.03.2012 by the learned Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench
reverses the Appellate judgment by the learned Additional District
Judge dated 17.03.2003 to uphold the judgment of the learned Trial
Court dated 17.05.2001. The appellants/plaintiffs’ suit was
dismissed by the learned Trial Court as being barred under Order
XXIII Rule 1 CPC and Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908. As such,
the learned High Court disapproved the learned Appellate Court’s
view to remand the case for allowing the parties to bring evidence
C.A.446 of 2012
2
about the terms of an oral compromise claimed between the
predecessors of the parties which led to the unconditional
withdrawal of an earlier suit filed by the appellants’ predecessor for
the same relief.
2.
The facts constituting the background of the present
case are that one Feroze owned property in village Bhoon, Tehsil
Kalar Kahar, District Chakwal. He had two wives; one named
Mst.Bibi and the other named Mst.Sardaran. Mst.Bibi had two sons,
namely, Muhammad Nawaz and Faqir Muhammad. Mst. Sardaran
had one son, Muhammad Shafi, and four daughters. When Feroze
died before partition, his property was distributed equally amongst
his three afore-named male heirs under customary law. Faqir
Muhammad died issueless in the year 1950 and was succeeded by
two heirs, his real brother Muhammad Nawaz and his mother
Mst.Bibi. However, his mutation of inheritance No.1147 dated
21.03.1951 was recorded in favour of the said two heirs and also his
consanguine brother and four sisters (“impugned mutation”).
3.
On 03.01.1957 both Muhammad Nawaz and his mother
Mst.Bibi filed a suit challenging the said mutation for being illegal.
Notices were issued to the defendants Muhammad Shafi and his
four sisters for 30.01.1957. The notices were not served on the
defendants who are predecessor of the present respondents, for
30.01.1957; none were in attendance. On that date, however,
Muhammad Nawaz got his statement recorded. He stated that a
C.A.446 of 2012
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compromise had been arrived with the defendants. Therefore he
prayed for withdrawal of his suit without the permission of the
Court for filing a fresh suit. Accordingly, the learned Trial Court
passed an order on 30.01.1957 dismissing the said suit as withdrawn.
Thereafter, the impugned mutation No.1147 dated 21.03.1951 was
neither cancelled nor modified. Muhammad Nawaz did not
challenge that mutation until his death in the year 1987.
4.
The appellants are the heirs of Muhammad Nawaz.
They filed a suit on 12.06.2000 for annulment of the impugned
mutation; however, their plaint did not mention the earlier suit filed
by Muhammad Nawaz. The appellants’ suit claims the same relief of
cancellation of the impugned mutation as prayed in the earlier suit
because: in the presence of the real brother Muhammad Nawaz and
mother Mst. Bibi of Faqir Muhammad deceased his consanguine
siblings, Muhammad Shafi and his four sisters are excluded from
being his heirs. The respondents/defendants filed their written
statement objecting to the maintainability of the said suit under
Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC. The basis of that objection is the Court’s
order dated 30.01.1957 which unconditionally dismisses as
withdrawn the earlier suit for the same relief filed by the appellants’
predecessor, Muhammad Nawaz against the predecessors of the
respondents. In response to the objection, the appellants applied for
amendment of their pleadings which was allowed both by the
learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court.
C.A.446 of 2012
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5.
A new paragraph 6A was accordingly incorporated by
the appellants in their plaint. This paragraph explains that the
predecessors of the respondents had conceded the claim of
Muhammad Nawaz, predecessor of the appellants, and had
renounced any entitlement in the legacy of Faqir Muhammad
deceased. Therefore, they handed over to Muhammad Nawaz
possession of the land taken by them from such legacy. The
possession of the returned land had thereafter remained with the
appellants/plaintiffs. The amended written statement filed by the
respondents denied paragraph 6A of the plaint and claimed that
Muhammad Nawaz predecessor of the appellants had withdrawn
his suit unilaterally after receipt of adequate compensation.
6.
In the background of the foregoing pleas of the parties,
a preliminary issue was framed by the learned Trial Court to the
effect:
“Whether the suit is hit by the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC
and the suit is not maintainable?”
The learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 17.05.2001 concluded
that the bar under the said provision of law applied to the suit filed
by the appellant in the year 2000. This suit was also held to be time
barred for having been filed 43 years after the cause of action
admittedly accrued in favour of the appellants’ predecessor. Vide
judgment dated 17.03.2003, the learned Appellate Court remanded
the case to the learned Trial Court by observing that it was proper to
grant an opportunity to the parties for recording their evidence on
C.A.446 of 2012
5
the plea of compromise taken by the appellants. In exercise of
Revisional jurisdiction the learned High Court on 16.03.2012
reversed the appellate judgment and reaffirmed the view taken by
the learned Trial Court in its judgment dated 17.05.2001. Hence, this
appeal.
7.
The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted
that by mentioning compensation the amended written statement by
the respondents impliedly admits the compromise averred by the
plaintiffs in their plaint; that a compromise is also mentioned in the
statement of Muhammad Nawaz, predecessor of the appellants,
recorded by the learned trial Court on 30.01.1957 due to which his
suit was dismissed as withdrawn. The respective stands taken by the
parties showed a dispute between them about the terms of the
compromise. It is contended that the appellants had a right to lead
evidence for proving such terms, which has wrongly been denied by
the impugned judgment. In any event, the learned High Court ought
to have confined itself to whether recording of evidence was
necessary for deciding the preliminary issue about the effect of
Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC. It was wrong for the learned High Court to
decide the said preliminary objection and to dismiss the appellants’
suit. Reliance has been placed on Mir Alam Shah vs. Adam Khan
(2004 CLC 1100), Mohsin Khan vs. Ahmad Ali (PLD 2004 Lahore
1), Subha Jayan vs. Meenakshy Kumaran (AIR 2004 Kerala 39),
C.A.446 of 2012
6
Kaluvaroya vs. Ganesa (AIR 1969 Madras 248) and Muhammad
Shafique vs. Muhammad Rafique (2012 YLR 2801).
8.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondents
submits that the order dated 30.01.1957 passed by the learned Trial
Court shows unconditional withdrawal of the suit filed by the
appellants’ predecessor which tantamounts to abandonment of the
claim by the plaintiff/ predecessor of the appellants. Secondly, he
submits that even if the compromise claimed in paragraph 6A of the
amended plaint is presumed, it is an established fact that such
compromise was not implemented
through
cancellation/
modification of the impugned mutation No.1147 dated 21.03.1951
and the transfer of title of the corresponding land in favour of
Muhammad Nawaz, the predecessor of the appellants. For 30 years
until his death the said Muhammad Nawaz was satisfied with the
impugned mutation remaining in the field. The compromise terms
alleged in paragraph 6A of the amended plaint cannot survive to the
extent that these conflict with the conduct of Muhammad Nawaz.
Accordingly, no right can vest in the appellants to now claim relief
conflicting with the impugned mutation. He also argued that, in any
case, the right available to Muhammad Nawaz was for enforcement
of the compromise terms. A suit for such a claim is time barred.
9.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and
having carefully perused the record, if seems useful to first read the
provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC:
“1.Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim.- (1) At
any time after the institution of a suit the plaintiff may, as against
C.A.446 of 2012
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all or any of the defendants, withdraw his suit or abandon part of
his claim.
(2) Where the Court is satisfied—
(a)
that a suit must fail by reason of some formal
defect, or
(b)
that there are other sufficient grounds for allowing
the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subjectmatter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such
terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission
to withdraw from such suit or abandon such part
of a claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in
respect of the subject matter of such suit or such
part of a claim.
(3) Where the plaintiff withdraws from a suit, or abandons part of
a claim, without the permission referred to in sub-rule (2), he
shall be liable for such costs as a Court may award and shall be
precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such
subject-matter or such part of the claim.
(4)
Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorize the
Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to withdraw without the
consent of the others.”
10.
Keeping the foregoing legal provision in view, there are
some established factual points of the case that may be noted first.
By the order dated 30.01.1957 Muhammad Nawaz withdrew his suit
unconditionally without seeking permission to file a fresh suit. An
oral compromise between Muhammad Nawaz and the defendants
was cited by the former as the basis of the withdrawal of his suit but
neither the terms of the compromise were stated before or recorded
by the learned Trial Court nor was any defendant examined before
the Trial Court to state or admit the terms of any compromise. The
impugned mutation No.1147 dated 21.03.1951 remained in existence
notwithstanding the compromise. Muhammad Nawaz did not file
any proceedings to enforce the terms of his compromise. In other
words, the impugned mutation and the unconditional withdrawal of
C.A.446 of 2012
8
the suit satisfied the oral compromise and Muhammad Nawaz lived
with it till his death in the year 1987.
11.
The amended plaint filed by the appellants claimed that
in the oral compromise Muhammad Shafi and his four sisters
accepted the impropriety of the impugned mutation No.1147 dated
21.03.1951; that they also returned possession of the land inherited
by them from the legacy of Faqir Muhammad deceased to
Muhammad Nawaz. Even if those statements of fact are assumed to
be correct, it may be observed firstly, that merely holding the
possession of land cannot confer its title through prescription. [Ref:
Maqbool Ahmad vs. Hakoomat-e-Pakistan (1991 SCMR 2063)].
Secondly, the inaction and acquiescence of Muhammad Nawaz to
challenge the impugned mutation No.1147 dated 21.03.1951 for 30
years is evidence that it complied with his compromise. Thirdly, in
the year 2000, when the appellants’ suit was filed, neither of the
parties to the oral compromise survived to prove its terms. At best
the appellants could bring hearsay evidence and that too after a
delay of 43 years. In the said circumstances, it is a futile argument by
the learned counsel for the appellants to ask for grant of an
opportunity to the parties to lead evidence about the terms of the
oral compromise. These facts establish that the withdrawal of the
earlier suit by Muhammad Nawaz was unconditional or that the
impugned mutation did not infringe any terms of the compromise
claimed by him with the predecessor of the respondents. In the
circumstances, the later suit filed by the appellants on the same
cause of action is barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC. Reliance
is placed upon Ghulam Rasool vs. Nusrat Rasool (PLD 2008 SC
146), Shahid Mehmood vs. Afzal Mehmood (2011 SCMR 551) and
Muhammad Yar vs. Muhammad Amin (2013 SCMR 464).
12.
Be that as it may, there is another important principle of
law laid down by this Court which is applicable to the facts of the
present case. An heir, who is directly affected by a wrongfully
recorded mutation of inheritance, fails to challenge such mutation
for a considerable length of time until his death, thereby deprives his
heirs of locus standi to dispute such mutation on the ground of his
estoppel, abandonment of claim/cause of action. Reference in this
regard is made to Abdul Haq vs. Surraya Begum (2002 SCMR
1330), Kala Khan vs. Rab Nawaz (2004 SCMR 517) and
Muhammad Rustam vs. Makhan Jan (2013 SCMR 299). The
appellants’ suit is not maintainable under that principle as well.
13.
The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants
that the aforementioned case law on locus standi is distinguishable
on the facts of the present case because Muhammad Nawaz had not
acquiesced to the impugned mutation but had once challenged the
same does not carry weight. The forbearance by Muhammad Nawaz
to dispute the impugned mutation on the basis of his oral compromise
either constitutes the satisfaction of his claim or the abandonment to his
grievance and cause of action. In either case, the result deprives the
C.A.446 of 2012
10
appellants of their locus standi to assert and allege the forgone claim
or entitlement. Finally, the judgments of the learned Trial Court and
the learned Revisional Court were required to and have given their
findings on the preliminary issue framed in the case. The avoidance
by the learned Appellate Court to give its finding on that issue
without giving reasons misdirects the proceedings. A short question
of law is involved for which the requisite material was available on
record for the learned High Court to decide the same in order to nip
the appellants’ still born claim in the bud. Accordingly, we consider
that the impugned Revisional and Trial Court judgments have
arrived at the right conclusion that the suit filed by the appellants is
barred by law.
For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in
this appeal; as such the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
J.
J.
Islamabad,
20.04.2016.
Irshad Hussain /*
APPROVED FOR REPORTING.
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