What is meant by promissory note | promissory note process in Pakistan


 Promissory note meaning in urdu


A promissory note is a written, unconditional promise by one party (the issuer or maker) to pay a specific sum of money to another party (the payee) either on demand or at a specified future date. It serves as a legal instrument acknowledging a debt and the commitment to repay.


ایک وعدہ نامہ ایک فریق (جاری کنندہ یا بنانے والے) کی طرف سے ایک تحریری، غیر مشروط وعدہ ہے کہ وہ کسی دوسرے فریق (ادا کنندہ) کو یا تو مطالبہ پر یا مستقبل کی مخصوص تاریخ پر رقم کی ایک مخصوص رقم ادا کرے۔ یہ ایک قانونی آلے کے طور پر کام کرتا ہے جو قرض کو تسلیم کرتا ہے اور اس کی ادائیگی کے عزم کو۔

Promissory note meaning and process



Copy of promissory note 





Case laws on promissory note

SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
PRESENT:
MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR
MR. JUSTICE SHAHID WAHEED
MS. JUSTICE MUSARRAT HILALI
Civil Appeal No.317-L of 2011
(On appeal against the judgment dated 
31.03.2008 passed by the Lahore High 
Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in 
RFA No.10 of 1997)
Mehr Noor Muhammad
…Appellant(s)
 
Versus
Nazir Ahmed
…Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
: Mrs. Tabinda Islam, ASC
For the Respondent(s)
: Mian Shah Abbas, ASC via 
video link from Lahore
Date of Hearing
: 06.11.2023
JUDGMENT
Shahid Waheed, J. One swallow does not a summer make. This 
case is illustrative of this adage.
2. 
This appeal arises in this way. The appellant before 
us is the plaintiff, who by a summary suit had sued upon a 
promissory note claiming that the defendant, respondent herein, 
owed him Rs.800,000. The defendant traversed the claim and 
posited that he used to purchase pesticide from the plaintiff and 
as he was illiterate, some blank papers thumb-marked by him 
were obtained by the plaintiff in business dealing, which he had 
now made a promissory note. He specifically denied making any 
promissory note and receiving Rs 800,000 thereunder from the 
plaintiff. On these assertions, issues were settled, and parties 
were called upon to produce evidence. During evidence, the 
objection was raised that the promissory note was not 
admissible in evidence: for, firstly, some of its revenue stamps 
were not cancelled, and secondly its second marginal witness in 
terms of Articles 17 and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat, 1984, was 
not produced before the Court. These objections were counted 
CA No.317-L of 2011
2
against the plaintiff. The facts pleaded by the plaintiff were also 
found to be disproved. The suit failed and was dismissed. The 
plaintiff could not succeed in appeal either. Now, with our leave, 
the plaintiff is before us. 
3. 
We have to first decide on the admissibility of the 
promissory note and, secondly, whether, in the given 
circumstances, the promissory note had been proved. The first 
question has two facets, and the law applicable to each is 
misconstrued and misapplied. We will explain how. The second 
question will illustrate the prefatory adage.
4. 
So far as the question of admissibility is concerned, 
the first objection was that since two witnesses attested the 
promissory note and one of them was not produced in Court, in 
terms of Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, it had to be 
excluded from evidence. This statement is not correct. It may be 
noted that as per Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, a promissory note is required to contain four essential 
ingredients: (i) an unconditional undertaking to pay, (ii) the sum 
should be the sum of money and certain, (iii) the payment 
should be to or to the order of a person who is certain, or to the 
bearer, of the instrument, and (iv) the maker should sign it. If an 
instrument fulfils these four conditions, it will be called a 
promissory note, and the requirement of attestation of a 
document provided under Article 17(2)(a) of the Qanun-eShahdat,1984, does not apply to a promissory note.1 That apart, 
two more things also need to be clarified here. First, if an 
instrument, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 of the 
Negotiable Instruments Act,1881, is attested by witnesses, the 
nature and character thereof shall not be affected. It shall 
remain a promissory note and shall not be converted into a bond 
within the meaning of section 2(5)(b) of the Stamp Act, 1899.2
Secondly, if a promissory note is not witnessed, it does not 
appear that any third person saw it signed, in which case, the 
best evidence is the handwriting of the parties. But if it is 
 
1Shiekh Muhammad Shakeel v. Shiekh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam (2014 SCMR 
1562); 
2 Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Boota (PLJ 2016 SC 169).
CA No.317-L of 2011
3
witnessed, then it appears, on the face of the promissory note, 
that there is better evidence behind it; and the best evidence 
that the nature of the case admits of, the law requires.3
5. 
There is no denying that in this case, two persons, 
namely Khalil Ahmed and Ghulam Hussain, were shown as 
witnesses of the promissory note, but only Ghulam Hussain 
(PW.2) was produced in the witness box. As stated above, the 
attestation of the promissory note was not a requirement of law; 
the non-appearance of the second witness could not be made a
ground for excluding the promissory note from evidence. It 
follows, therefore, that the courts erred in law in holding that 
the promissory note was not admissible in evidence.
6. 
The second objection to the admissibility of the 
promissory note was that some of its adhesive stamps were not 
cancelled. A perusal of the record reveals that Bashir Ahmad 
(PW-1), stamp vendor and deed writer, tendered the promissory 
note in his examination-in-chief, and immediately after his 
tender, counsel for the defendant objected that all its stamps 
were not cancelled and, thus, it was not admissible in evidence. 
The Trial Court, after noting this objection, held that it would be 
decided while making a final judgment, marked the promissory 
note as Ex.P.1and proceeded with the trial. The promissory note 
was then used by the parties in examination and crossexamination. The record shows that the Trial Court, in its final 
judgment, after reviewing the evidence, held that the objection of 
non-admissibility of the promissory note was valid and 
dismissed the suit. This leads us to consider whether the 
procedure adopted by the Trial Court was correct and whether, 
in such circumstances, the promissory note could not be held to 
be admissible in evidence. To find the answer to these questions, 
a quick but careful look at Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899,
will be helpful. Section 36 is in these terms:
36. Admission of instrument where not to be 
questioned: Where an instrument has been admitted in 
evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided 
in section 61, be called in question at any stage of the 
 
3 January v. Goodman [1 U.S 2008 (1787)
CA No.317-L of 2011
4
same suit or proceeding on the ground that the 
instrument has not been duly stamped.
This section is categorical in its terms that when a document 
has once been admitted in evidence, such admission cannot be 
called into question at any stage of the suit or in proceedings, on 
the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. The 
only exception the section recognizes is the class of cases 
contemplated by Section 61, which is not material to the present 
moot. Section 36 does not admit other exceptions. It is now well 
settled that where a question as to the admissibility of a 
document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped 
or has not been properly stamped, it has to be decided there and 
then when the document is tendered in evidence. Once the 
Court, rightly or wrongly, admits the document in evidence and 
allows the parties to use it in examination and crossexamination, so far as the parties are concerned, the matter is 
closed. It is, therefore, essential that parties to litigation, where 
such a controversy is raised, must be cautious, and the party 
challenging the admissibility of the document must be alert to 
see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court. 
The Court is also required to judicially determine the matter as 
soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is 
marked as an exhibit in the case. On the contrary, the record in 
this case discloses that, notwithstanding the defendant’s 
objection, the promissory note was marked as Ex.P.1 under the 
signature of the Court. It is not, therefore, one of those cases 
where a document had been inadvertently admitted. So, once 
the promissory note had been marked as an exhibit and the trial 
had proceeded along the footing that the promissory note was 
made an exhibit, and had been used by the parties in the 
examination and cross-examination of their witnesses, then 
Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899, will come into operation. 
Inasmuch as the promissory note had been admitted in 
evidence, as aforesaid, it was not open to the Trial Court to 
exclude it from consideration while writing the final judgment, 
nor to the appellate Court. It is clarified that the admission of 
the document in terms of Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899,
cannot be reviewed or revised by the same Court or a Court of 
CA No.317-L of 2011
5
superior jurisdiction.4So, we hold that the approach was 
incorrect, and the Courts below had erred in law in refusing to 
admit the promissory note in evidence.
7.
It is clear from the above discussion that in the 
present circumstances of the case, the promissory note was 
admissible and could not be excluded from evidence. But was 
this enough for the plaintiff's claim to succeed? In our opinion, 
this was not sufficient, and he had yet to discharge another 
burden, and that was to prove that the promissory note was 
valid. This was because the defendant had pleaded non est 
factum to the promissory note. He had stated in his written 
statement that he had neither borrowed any money from the 
plaintiff nor executed any promissory note to repay the alleged 
amount. Explaining this, the defendant said that he was an 
illiterate person, the plaintiff was in the business of lending 
pesticides at double cost, and he thumbed several blank papers
while procuring the pesticides from him, and it could be that the 
plaintiff had used these documents to make a promissory note. 
This statement indicates that the matter to be resolved here is 
not one where one person knowingly signs and delivers to 
another paper stamped in accordance with the law, either wholly 
blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable 
instrument, in order that it may be made or completed into a 
negotiable instrument. Therefore, the principle governing such 
cases, explained in different case law,5 would be inapplicable 
here. 
8.
On the stance of the defendant stated above, the 
Trial Court framed issue No.1, by which it was to prove whether 
the promissory note in question was a forged document. The 
initial onus to prove issue No.1 was upon the defendant. He 
discharged the onus to prove this negative fact and 
substantiated his allegations by making a statement, on oath, 
 
4Javer Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana (AIR 1961 SC 1655);
Rehmat Ali v. Wahid Bux (NLR 1979 Civil (SC) 809); and Union Insurance 
Company of Pakistan Ltd. v. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1978 SC 279).
5Mian Rafique Saigol v. Bank of Credit & Commerce (PLD 1996 SC 749);
Muhammad Arshad v. Citibank N.A. (2006 SCMR 1347); and Muhammad 
Azizur Rehman v. Liaquat Ali (2007 SCMR 1820)
CA No.317-L of 2011
6
while appearing before the Trial Court as DW-4. The onus was 
then shifted to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was 
bona fide and that the promissory note was legal6. The plaintiff 
appeared before the Trial Court as PW-2 and stated that he 
accompanied the defendant and the witnesses to the Court 
premises, where at the instance of the defendant, a deed writer 
named Bashir Ahmad scribed the promissory note, upon which 
the defendant had thumb-marked, and the witnesses had 
signed, and then he gave Rs.800,000 to the defendant in the 
presence of the witnesses. However, in his cross-examination, he 
admitted that he had no business relationship with the 
defendant or family ties with him. This statement causes 
eyebrows to be raised and gives a fillip to ponder how the 
plaintiff could lend a considerable amount to a stranger. This 
necessitates examining the circumstances of this case more 
carefully. Here, it must be noted that circumstantial evidence is 
sufficient when it enables the Court to make reasonable 
inferences about the ultimate facts in issue; it must be more 
than mere conjecture, speculation, or guess.7 With this principle 
in mind, we proceed. It is a matter of common knowledge that in 
the course of the ordinary conduct of such a transaction, a twostep procedure is followed. Firstly, the document is written on a
paper (or the blanks of the printed document are filled in, as 
happened in the present case) and then it is signed or thumbmarked. This is a standard mode of deed writing. According to 
the plaintiff, the same procedure was adopted; however, the 
defendant alleges that the plaintiff, while giving him pesticides, 
had obtained his thumb mark on some blank papers on which 
he had made the promissory note, so what is to be seen whether 
the promissory note (Ex.P-1) was written on a paper on which 
the thumb-mark was already present. This can be easily 
deciphered by having a look at the promissory note. It is visible 
to the naked eye that the blanks of a printed form of a 
promissory note (Ex.P.1) are filled in with black ink, names of 
 
6 Johnson v. The Duke of Marlborough (2 Stark. Rep 313); Henman v. 
Dickinson (5 Bing. 183); and Simpson v. Stackhouse (9 Barr. 186)
7 Galloway v. United States (319 US 372); and Popken v. Formers Mut. 
HomesIns. Co. (180 Neb.250).
No.317-L of 2011
7
the parties and witnesses are also written with black ink, while 
the ink of the thumb mark is purple. It is also clear that black 
ink superimposes the purple ink of the thumb mark, and this 
depiction elucidates that the paper was first thumb-marked and 
then written upon. In case otherwise, the purple ink of the 
thumb mark would have overlapped the black ink of the writing. 
From such a circumstance, we can fairly and reasonably draw 
the only conclusion that the stance of the defendant that blank 
documents thumb-marked by him had been converted to a 
promissory note is correct. It is trite law that the witness may 
lie, but circumstances/documents do not. There is nothing on 
record to suggest that the defendant had, expressly or impliedly, 
authorized the plaintiff to use the said blank papers as 
promissory note. We are, therefore, poised to hold that the 
promissory note was not executed in the manner described by 
the plaintiff, and the probable inference is that the promissory 
note was the result of knavery on the part of the plaintiff. 
9.
We now focus on another aspect of the matter and 
examine whether the preponderance of evidence brought on 
record suggest a probability to conclude that any amount was 
paid to the defendant. Be it noted here, no doubt, special rules 
of evidence are provided for under the Negotiable Instrument 
Act, 1881. Its section 118 says that until the contrary is proved, 
inter alia the presumption that every negotiable instrument was 
made for consideration shall be drawn. Such a presumption is 
only a prima facie, and may be displaced by raising a probable 
defence. Since the circumstantial evidence discussed above gave 
rise to a probable defence and created a reasonable doubt 
regarding the valid execution of the promissory note (Ex.P.1), the 
burden was shifted to the plaintiff to prove the payment of 
consideration of Rs.800,0008 and as such, we have to examine 
the plaintiff’s evidence. The deed writer (PW-1) was one of the 
plaintiff’s material witnesses. He, in his statement, admitted that 
though he wrote the amount of Rs.800,000, but this fact was 
reflected in his register by pencil. He was confronted with the 
 
8 Reverend Mother Marykutty v. Reni C. Kottaram and another (2013) 1 SCC 
CA No.317-L of 2011
8
various entries made in his register in black ink and asked as to 
why he wrote the amount of Rs.800,000 with pencil and not 
black ink that he had used for the promissory note, and he had 
no plausible explanation to give in his cross-examination. This 
statement created the first reason for suspicion. The next 
witness in the row was the plaintiff himself. He was PW.2. He, in 
his cross-examination categorically stated that he had no 
relation with the defendant, and neither was he in the business 
of selling pesticides. This statement reflects some awkward 
transactions and raises another severe doubt in the mind as to 
how the plaintiff could lend a huge sum of money to a person 
with whom he had no relation or acquaintance. The last witness 
of the plaintiff was Ghulam Hussain (PW.3). This witness stated 
that a sum of Rs.800,000 was given to the defendant in the form 
of notes having denominations of 500 and 1000 in the Court 
premises. Again, this is an unusual act and is another factor for 
wariness because, normally, such dealing would take place in 
private, where money can safely and securely be handed over 
and counted by the other party; this clearly cannot be done in 
Court premises, on the stall of a stamp vendor. The last but not 
least aspect of the matter is that two persons were named as 
witnesses in the promissory note (Ex.P.1), but only Ghulam 
Hussain (PW.3) was produced, while the other witness, Khalil
Ahmad, was not produced in the Court. No explanation was 
made available for the atypical circumstances described above. 
Such evidence that draws a veil over truth or does not explain 
the true intent and purpose of that transaction, which does not 
take place in the manner in which it is done in the ordinary 
course of human conduct, never inspires confidence and, thus, 
does not serve to persuade the court to tip the scales in favour of 
a person who is burdened to prove the fact. Given this scenario, 
we return our findings against the plaintiff and declare that the 
payment of any amount to the defendant has not been proved. 
And so, as the prefatory adage suggests, the only fortune that 
the plaintiff had was to get the thumb mark of the defendant on 
the blank papers, but his ploy could not set sail in Court
317-L of 2011
9
10.
The above discussion concludes that the plaintiff 
had failed to prove that the promissory note was not forged; 
consequently, he was not entitled to the decree as he sought in 
his plaint, for contemporaneous payment was also not proved. 
Therefore, we are not inclined to disturb the dismissal of the 
suit, not for the reasons given by the Courts below, but for what 
we have stated above.
11.
This appeal fails, and accordingly, it is dismissed.
Judge


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