Sui Gas Company can't chang tariff without notice to consumer. Case against overcharging of sui Gas .
Tariff can't be changed without notice to consumer |
- Sui Gas Company ne saraf ko batai bghair us ka tariff change kar dia.
- Or jab bill aya tu wo buhat mehnga tha .
- Consumer ne civil court main dawa kar dia
- Consumer ne moaqaf ikhtiyar kia ke notice diye bghair tariff change kia gia.
- Jiss ke baad evidence ke duran gwah ne tasleem kia ke koi notice serve nahi kia gia tha
- Consumer ne Appeal High court main jeet li or bill maaf.
Order of the High court.
R.S.A No.14411 and 14408 of 2019
and Decree dated 29.11.2017. The primary reason that prevailed with
both learned Courts below was the admission of the witnesses of the
Appellant who conceded in their depositions that upon shifting of
source of supply to the Respondent from one zone to another, no
notice was given to it with respect to change of rate at high GCV.
3.
Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that while deciding
issues of law as well as facts both the learned Courts below misread
evidence on record and Appellant was well within its right to claim
excessive amount without any notice to the Respondent. According to
learned counsel the benefit extended to the Respondent through
Impugned Judgments and Decrees is illegal and unlawful.
4.
Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent while
supporting Impugned Judgments and Decrees submits that
Respondent cogently established its case through evidence and
according to learned counsel the contentions of misreading and nonreading of evidence cannot be entertained in Regular Second Appeal,
as right to file Second Appeal as provided under Section 100 CPC,
could only be set into motion when the decision Impugned is contrary
to law or there was failure to determine some material issues of law,
therefore, the questions now being raised by the Appellant cannot be
entertained by this Court while adjudicating upon instant Appeals.
Additionally, learned counsel submits that Judgment and Decree of
the Appellate Court was passed on 29.11.2017 against which
Appellant filed Appeal on 12.02.2018 through diary No.163588.
According to learned counsel upon institution of Appeal, the office
raised objections and file was retrieved by the Appellant from the
office and after removal of objection, the Appeal was re-filed on
11.03.2019. Therefore, according to learned counsel these Appeals are
barred by time and cannot be pressed by the Appellant. According to
learned counsel despite having concurrent findings in its favour, the
Respondent even after lapse of 07 years is unable to reap fruits and
- benefits of the Impugned Judgments and Decrees.
R.S.A No.14411 and 14408 of 2019
and Decree dated 29.11.2017. The primary reason that prevailed with
both learned Courts below was the admission of the witnesses of the
Appellant who conceded in their depositions that upon shifting of
source of supply to the Respondent from one zone to another, no
notice was given to it with respect to change of rate at high GCV.
3.
Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that while deciding
issues of law as well as facts both the learned Courts below misread
evidence on record and Appellant was well within its right to claim
excessive amount without any notice to the Respondent. According to
learned counsel the benefit extended to the Respondent through
Impugned Judgments and Decrees is illegal and unlawful.
4.
Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent while
supporting Impugned Judgments and Decrees submits that
Respondent cogently established its case through evidence and
according to learned counsel the contentions of misreading and nonreading of evidence cannot be entertained in Regular Second Appeal,
as right to file Second Appeal as provided under Section 100 CPC,
could only be set into motion when the decision Impugned is contrary
to law or there was failure to determine some material issues of law,
therefore, the questions now being raised by the Appellant cannot be
entertained by this Court while adjudicating upon instant Appeals.
Additionally, learned counsel submits that Judgment and Decree of
the Appellate Court was passed on 29.11.2017 against which
Appellant filed Appeal on 12.02.2018 through diary No.163588.
According to learned counsel upon institution of Appeal, the office
raised objections and file was retrieved by the Appellant from the
office and after removal of objection, the Appeal was re-filed on
11.03.2019. Therefore, according to learned counsel these Appeals are
barred by time and cannot be pressed by the Appellant. According to
learned counsel despite having concurrent findings in its favour, the
Respondent even after lapse of 07 years is unable to reap fruits and
benefits of the Impugned Judgments and Decrees.
R.S.A No.14411 and 14408 of 2019
5.
Arguments of learned counsel have been heard and record has
been perused with their able assistance. The relationship inter se
parties is admitted. The question that was determined by the Courts
below through Impugned Judgments and Decrees was whether
contrary to the terms of Gas Supply Agreement excess amount could
have been claimed by the Appellant upon shifting of supply zones
without notice or intimation to the Respondent.
6.
In Gas Sector, CNG industry is only consumer of SNGPL
which fills CNG cylinders by compressing natural gas instead of
burning and consuming it. The tariff for consumption of Compressed
Natural Gas is determined by the competent authority i.e. Oil & Gas
Regulatory Authority (“OGRA”), which is actually Energy based
instead of Value based and BTU’s consumed are calculated on the
basis of Standard Cubic Feet which are measured by heating capacity
of Gross Calorific Value (GCV). It was case of the Respondent that
natural gas supplied from South zone was with BTUs/SCG950GCV
and according to OGRA Tariff the price for gas from said zone was
Rs.53.63 and Rs.55.33 per K.G. The Appellant issued gas bill to the
Respondent for the month of June, 2010 and charged 16%
exaggerated value on the ground that in the said month the gas was
supplied to the Respondent form
North zone with
BUT’s/SCF1000GCV. It was this aspect evaluated by the learned
Courts in the light of terms and conditions contained in the Gas
Supply Agreement and upon analysis of respective evidence led by
the parties both Courts below reached to concurrent findings that since
witnesses of SNGPL in their depositions admitted that no notice as
per agreement and practice for change of zones was given to the
Respondent, therefore, 16% excessive charge for gas consumption for
the month of June, 2010 was illegal and unlawful.
7.
Learned counsel has been questioned about the questions of
law that may justify institution of this Appeal in terms of Section 100
of the CPC and despite hectic efforts, this Court is not convinced that
in peculiar circumstances of instant case, the questions of re-appraisal,
R.S.A No.14411 and 14408 of 2019
re-hearing and re-evaluating the evidence of the determination of facts
can be undertaken at this stage, that too in a Second Appeal. Law
clearly draws distinction between scope of first appeal and second
appeal. Under Section 100 of the CPC, appeal only lies to High Court
on the grounds that the decision is either contrary to law or it fails to
determine some material issue of law or it suffers from substantial
error or defect in the procedure provided by the Code or law. Meaning
thereby that it does not lie to question the findings on facts especially
when these findings are concurrent and nature of challenge raised by
Appellant is bereft of material on record.
8.
In the instant case, it is quite obvious that the Impugned
Judgments and Decrees of the Courts below are neither contrary to
law nor contrary to any usage having the force of law. The concurrent
Impugned Judgments and Decrees also reflect that the Courts below
had not omitted to decide any material issue on law or usage having
the force of law. So far as the question of substantial error is
concerned, this Court is satisfied that no substantial error arises from
the Impugned Judgments and Decrees and the Instant Appeals even
fail to cross the minimum standards set up by Section 100 of the CPC.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon “Bahar Shah and others versus
Manzoor Ahmad” (2022 SCMR 284), “Zafar Iqbal and others versus
Naseer Ahmed and others” (2022 SCMR 2006) and “Syed Rafiul
Qadre Naqvi versus Syeda Safia Sultana and others” (2009 SCMR
254). In a recent case of Zafar Iqbal supra, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of Pakistan while interpreting the scope and ambit of section
100 of the CPC has declared that:-
“Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 ("C.P.C."), a second appeal to the High Court lies only on
any of the following grounds: (a) the decision being contrary to
law or usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having
failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having
the force of law; and (c) a substantial error or defect in the
procedure provided by C.P.C. or by any other law for the time
being in force, which may possibly have produced error or
defect in the decision of the case upon merits. The scope of
second appeal is thus restricted and limited to these grounds, as
R.S.A No.14411 and 14408 of 2019
section 101 expressly mandates that no second appeal shall lie
except on the grounds mentioned in section 100. But we have
noticed that notwithstanding such clear provisions on the scope
of second appeal, sometimes the High Courts deal with and
decide second appeals as if those were first appeals: they thus
assume and exercise a jurisdiction which the High Courts do
not possess, and thereby also contribute for unjustified
prolongation of litigation process which is already chocked
with high pendency of cases.”
9.
The second contention of learned counsel for the Respondent
about time barred appeal is also creditworthy and carries weight. It
appears that the Impugned Judgment and Decree passed by the
Appellate Court is dated 29.11.2017. The Appeal was filed through
diary No.163588 on 12.02.2018 to which office raised objection and
typed Objection Sheet (Civil) described date for re-submission of
Appeal after removal of objections was 03 days.
10.
Admittedly, instead of re-submitting the file after removal of
objections within prescribed limitation, the Appellant re-filed the
Appeal on 11.03.2019. Hence, when the Appeal was re-filed it had
become barred by time. In a Judgment reported as “Asad Ali and 9
others versus The Bank of Punjab and others” (PLD 2020 SC 736),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that there is
consistency in the principles that if objections raised by the office are
not removed during the period allowed by the office and meanwhile
the limitation period expires, the Petition become barred by time.
While relying upon “Lahore Development Authority vs. Muhammad
Rashid” (1997 SCMR 1224), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:-
“Starting from the judgment of the Lahore High Court Lahore
reported as Ghulam Hussain V. Bahadar (PLD 1954 Lahore 361)
till judgment of this Court reported as Lahore Development
Authority v. Muhammad Rashid (1997 SCMR 1224), there is
consistency in the principle that if objections raised by the office are
not removed during the period allowed by the office and meanwhile
the limitation period expires, the petition would become barred by
time. There are two subsequent judgments of this Court reported as
Mst. Sabiran Bi v. Ahmad Khan (2000 SCMR 847) and Farman All
v. Muhammad Ishaq (PLD 2013 SC 392) which are incorrectly
understood to have decided that so long as the initial institution is
within the limitation period, removal of objections raised by the
office after expiry of the limitation period does not render the
petition to be barred by time. The said judgments have been
R.S.A No.14411 and 14408 of 2019
rendered in a different set of facts and circumstances, do not lay
down the entire law on the subject and are distinguishable on points
of law as well as facts.”
11.
Since concurrent findings contained in the Impugned
Judgments and Decrees have been passed after evaluating the legal as
well as factual aspects; evidence on record and admissions made
during cross-examination by the witnesses presented by SNGPL and
appreciating the position of law with respect to interpretation of
subject matter Gas Supply Agreement, therefore, this Court is not
persuaded to interfere in the Impugned Judgments and Decrees on
their merits. Additionally, this Court holds that by virtue of delayed
re-submission of the instant Appeal, the same is barred by time in
view of law laid down in Asad Ali’s case supra. Consequently, the
instant as well as connected R.S.A are dismissed with no order as to
costs.
(MUHAMMAD RAZA QURESHI)
JUDGE
Approved for reporting
Sir
ReplyDeleteAbu ki death ho chuki Hy
Abu ek ghr aur ek makan chor k gye thy. Hum 7 bhan Bhai Hy . Humri Ami Allahumduliia hayat Hy. Problem yeh Hy k ek Bhai nay shop sell Kar k apna hisa lay liya Hy . Aub chota Bhai zid kar rahy hy k ghr sell Kar k Moja hisa do .
Problem yeh Hy Ami is ghr main rehty Hy or is ko or is k biwi bacho ko kuch nhi khty. Agr ghr jata Hy to Ami Khan jy gi q k ghr srif 18 lac sell ho ga jis main Ami sub ko hisa day kuch nhi bacha.
App say yeh pochna Hy k choty Bhai ko Ami kis trhn rooky k jub Tak woh Hy Ami ko tang nhi Kary.
Ghr Abu k naam hy.
Sir ek baat or Bara bhai ko hisa day diya aur saboot Hy k hum NY day diya phir bhi woh tang Kar raha Hy k ghr say dobra hisa chy
Jinab jab koi banda foat hu jai tu warso ka hissa ban jata. Agar koi nahi rehta tu taqseem karna pare ga yehi islami or qanooni tareeqa hai.
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