prevention of smuggling act case law.






**کیس:**

کیس کا تعلق "پریونشن آف اسموگلنگ ایکٹ، 1977" سے ہے۔ اینٹی نارکوٹکس فورس (ANF) نے معلومات فراہم کی کہ کچھ ملزمان نے سمگلنگ کے ذریعے جائداد حاصل کی ہے۔ خصوصی جج نے ملزمان کو جائداد کی ضبطگی کے احکام جاری کیے، لیکن ملزمان کو ایک متبادل دیا کہ وہ جائداد کی مارکیٹ ویلیو کے برابر جرمانہ ادا کریں۔

ملزمان نے اس فیصلے کے خلاف اپیل دائر کی، جس میں کہا گیا کہ اینٹی نارکوٹکس فورس کو "پریشان" تسلیم کر کے اپیل کرنے کا حق دیا جائے۔ خصوصی اپیلیٹ کورٹ نے اپیل کو ناقابل قبول قرار دیا، اور پشاور ہائی کورٹ نے بھی اس فیصلے کی توثیق کی۔

**فیصلہ:**

سپریم کورٹ نے فیصلہ دیا کہ اینٹی نارکوٹکس فورس کو "پریشان" نہیں سمجھا جا سکتا کیونکہ اس نے کوئی قانونی نقصان نہیں اٹھایا بلکہ صرف فیصلے سے نالاں تھی۔ عدالت نے اس نتیجے پر پہنچا کہ سیکشن 43 کے تحت اپیل کا حق صرف انہیں دیا جا سکتا ہے جن کے حقوق متاثر ہوئے ہوں۔ اس کے علاوہ، عدالت نے اس بات پر زور دیا کہ قانونی خامیوں کو دور کرنے کے لیے پارلیمنٹ کو قانون میں ترمیم کرنی چاہیے تاکہ ریاست یا حکومت کو بھی اپیل کا حق فراہم کیا جا سکے۔

لہذا، سپریم کورٹ نے اینٹی نارکوٹکس فورس کی اپیل مسترد کر دی اور سفارش کی کہ قانون میں مناسب تبدیلیاں کی جائیں۔
**پریونشن آف اسموگلنگ ایکٹ، 1977** (Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977) پاکستان کا ایک قانونی فریم ورک ہے جو سمگلنگ کے خلاف کارروائی کے لیے وضع کیا گیا ہے۔ اس قانون کی اہم تفصیلات درج ذیل ہیں:

1. **مقصد:** اس قانون کا مقصد سمگلنگ اور غیر قانونی تجارت کو روکنا ہے، خاص طور پر ایسی اشیاء جو کہ غیر قانونی طور پر ملک میں لائی گئی ہوں۔

2. **خسارہ اور ضبطگی:** اگر کسی پراپرٹی کو سمگلنگ کے ذریعے حاصل کیا گیا ہو، تو اس قانون کے تحت متعلقہ جج اس پراپرٹی کو ضبط کرنے کا حکم دے سکتا ہے۔ قانون کی دفعات کے تحت، ایسے مال کی ضبطگی کی جاتی ہے جو سمگلنگ کے ذریعے حاصل کیا گیا ہو۔

3. **پروسیجر:** 
   - **سیکشن 31:** اس کے تحت، جج سمگلنگ سے متعلق معلومات پر نوٹس جاری کرتا ہے اور ملزمان کو اپنے دفاع میں جواب دینے کا موقع فراہم کرتا ہے۔
   - **سیکشن 32:** جج اس بات کا تعین کرتا ہے کہ آیا پراپرٹی سمگلنگ کے ذریعے حاصل کی گئی ہے یا نہیں اور فیصلہ صادر کرتا ہے۔
   - **سیکشن 34:** اگر پراپرٹی کو ضبط کرنا مشکل ہو، تو ملزمان کو اس کی قیمت ادا کرنے کا آپشن دیا جاتا ہے۔

4. **اپیل:** 
   - **سیکشن 43:** اس دفعہ کے تحت، "پریشان" شخص (جو قانونی طور پر متاثر ہوا ہو) خصوصی اپیلیٹ کورٹ میں اپیل دائر کر سکتا ہے۔

یہ قانون سمگلنگ سے نمٹنے اور غیر قانونی سرگرمیوں کو روکنے کے لیے اقدامات فراہم کرتا ہے اور ان سے متعلقہ قانونی کارروائیوں کے لیے ایک فریم ورک تیار کرتا ہے۔
SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
Present:
Mr. Justice Munib Akhtar 
Mr. Justice Shahid Waheed 
Ms. Justice Musarrat Hilali
Civil Appeal No.277 of 2014
(On appeal against the judgment 
dated 30.05.2012 passed by the 
Peshawar High Court, Peshawar 
in W.P.1770/2005).
The State through A.N.F., Rawalpindi
…Appellant(s)
Versus
Obaid Khan (decd) through LRs & others
…Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s)
: Mr. Inaam Amin Minhas, Special 
Prosecutor General, ANF
Ch. Ehtisham ul Haq, Special 
Prosecutor NAB
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. Saleem Shah Hoti, ASC
Date of Hearing
: 23.11.2023
JUDGMENT
Shahid Waheed, J: We granted leave for this appeal as it 
involves a question that has not been addressed by this 
Court before. The question for the decision is short, but its 
legal import is significant and merits an incisive 
examination of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 (the 
Act). The question is whether the complainant, 
particularly the Anti-Narcotic Force, can be considered a 
“person aggrieved” to prefer an appeal under section 43 of 
the Act before the Special Appellate Court.
2. 
A thumbnail sketch of the sequence of facts 
may be in place to fully comprehend the moot question. 
C.A.277/2014
 
 2
On the 28th of April, 1998, the Anti Narcotic Force,
established under the Anti Narcotic Force Act, 1997, 
furnished information to the Special Judge (Central), 
Customs, Taxation and Anti Smuggling in Peshawar. The 
information stated that the private respondents (accused) 
had specific properties suspected of being acquired 
through smuggling. In response, the Special Judge issued 
a notice under Section 31 of the Act, calling on the 
accused to explain why the properties should not be 
declared as acquired through smuggling. The accused 
were also required under section 31(2) of the Act to 
indicate the source of their income, the income and assets 
used to acquire the properties and provide evidence to 
refute the complaint against them. The accused responded 
by denying the allegations against them. After reviewing 
the explanation and evidence presented and allowing the 
accused to be heard, the Special Judge recorded his 
finding on the 15th of January, 2004, that the accused 
had acquired up to 40% of the alleged properties through 
smuggling. The Special Judge, thus, under Section 32 of 
the Act, declared that the share of the properties acquired 
by smuggling stood forfeited to the Federal Government, 
while the share of properties acquired through legitimate 
means belonged to the accused. Since the share of the 
accused could not be easily separated, they were given the 
option to pay a fine equivalent to the market value of the 
property prevalent at the time, which was Rs.9,461,200, 
C.A.277/2014
 
 3
in lieu of forfeiture of that part of the property under 
section 34 of the Act. Through the Deputy Attorney 
General for Pakistan, the State filed an appeal under 
section 43 of the Act against the order of the Special 
Judge before the Special Appellate Court. The accused 
objected to the maintainability of the appeal under section 
43 of the Act, citing the precedent set by Haji Iqbal Shah,1
which stated that the right of appeal under section 43 of 
the Act was restricted to a “person” who did not include 
the State. Since the Peshawar High Court Division Bench 
had approved this precedent, the Special Appellate Court 
found it binding. It dismissed the appeal as being not 
maintainable by judgment dated 21st of March, 2005. The 
State, the Government of Pakistan, and the Anti Narcotic 
Force then jointly filed a petition under Article 199 of the 
Constitution in the Peshawar High Court seeking an 
order, like a writ of certiorari, to quash the above-stated 
orders. The High Court upheld the view of the Special 
Appellate Court and dismissed the petition by its order 
dated 30th of May, 2012.2
3. 
Given the facts, the question at hand appears 
to depend entirely on the true construction of section 43 of 
the Act. Before we go any further, it is important to 
remember one general principle: the right of appeal is a 
 
1 Anti Narcotics Force v. Haji Iqbal Shah [1999 P.Cr.L.J 1125].
2 Federal Government v. Obaid Khan [2012 P.Cr.L.J 1765].
C.A.277/2014
 
 4
creation of a statute, and no such right can be implied.3
We now proceed to consider the language of section 43 of 
the Act. This section enacts that “any person aggrieved by 
an order of the Special Judge passed under section 31, 
section 32 or section 34 may, within thirty days from the 
date of such order, prefer an appeal before the Special 
Appellate Court whose decision thereon shall be final.” The 
words “person aggrieved” seems to be the governing 
words, and show that the object of the legislature is to give 
an appeal where the legal right of the person is infringed 
and he has suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense 
that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially 
and directly affected by order of the Special Judge passed 
under section 31, 32 or 34 of the Act. To perfect the 
understanding of this point, we deem it appropirate to 
quote here the remarks made by James L. J. in Re 
Sidebotham.4 He said, ‘the words “person aggrieved” do 
not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit 
which he might have received if some other order had been 
made. A “person aggrieved” must be a man who has 
suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision 
has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of 
something, or wrongfully refused him something, or 
wrongfully affected his title to something.’ However, in the 
present case, it is said that the Anti Narcotic Force, being 
 
3 Benson v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board [(1942) All E.R 
465)].
4 Re Sidebotham [(1880) 14 Ch. D. 458]
C.A.277/2014
 
 5
the complainant, was “aggrieved” as it had informed the 
Special Judge that the properties were acquired by 
smuggling, which was erroneously found not true by the 
Special Judge. We are not disposed to accept that. A plain 
reading of the Act’s scheme, particularly section 31, 
clarifies that the Special Judge may receive information 
(complaint) from ‘any person’. In this case, as discussed 
above, the informer was the Anti-Narcotic Force. After the 
information was conveyed to the Special Judge, the 
informer had no further role, as there was no statutory 
duty for the informer to appear before the Special Judge 
nor to produce evidence supporting the information. The 
informer was also not required to file a written statement 
in response to the accused’s position, and the Special 
Judge was not required to adjudicate between the accused 
and the informer. Quite the contrary, after receiving the 
information, the matter entirely had become one between 
the Special Judge and the accused. This is so because, 
under Section 33 of the Act, the accused bears the burden 
of proving that any property specified in a notice under 
Section 31 is not acquired through smuggling. It appears 
that it was for this reason the Anti-Narcotic Force, apart 
from the information presented to the Special Judge, did 
not adduce any oral or documentary evidence. At that, its 
no legal right was infringed, and it had suffered no legal 
wrong or injury. In the circumstances, the Anti-Narcotic 
Force, which could not succeed in getting a forfeiture 
C.A.277/2014
 
 6
order against all the properties of the accused, could be 
said, to be annoyed by the findings of the Special Judge. It 
could also feel that what was considered a breach of law 
was wrongly held to be not a breach of law by the Special 
Judge. Despite all this, the Anti Narcotic Force could not 
be described as a person aggrieved rather as a person 
annoyed at best, and so, was not entitled to prefer an 
appeal against the Special Judge’s order under section 43 
of the Act.5 As a result, its appeal was rightly held to be 
not maintainable. We accordingly dismiss this appeal.
4. 
Before parting, we are compelled to observe in 
light of the points explained in the preceding paragraphs 
that serious procedural and substantive lacunas exist in 
the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977, which, in our 
opinion, necessitates Parliament’s intervention to amend 
the law. The Act does not provide any room for 
rectification of an incorrect order, as it is only a “person 
aggrieved” who may appeal against an order of the Special 
Judge under section 43, which, in essence, renders the 
order in favour of the accused final. It is further to be 
noted that we examined the practices and statutes
pertaining to property forfeiture resulting from criminal 
activity in other jurisdictions. In our research, we found a 
consistent provision expressly providing the right to the 
State or Government to appeal against an order of a court 
 
5 The Queen v. The Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County 
of London [(1890) 25 QBD 357], and
 R v. London Justices, Ex-parte Fulham Vestry [(1886-90) All E.R 
537].
C.A.277/2014
 
 7
if it is not satisfied by the outcome in almost all 
jurisdictions.6 Therefore, we deem it appropriate to refer 
the matter to Parliament to consider providing the State or 
Government the right of appeal under section 43 by 
amending the Act, in order to achieve its true objective 
and intended purpose.
5.
The Registrar of this Court shall send a copy of 
this judgment to the Hon’ble Chairperson of the Law and 
Justice Commission, Attorney General for Pakistan and 
Secretary Law to Government of Pakistan for their 
information and appropriate action.
Judge
Judge
Judge
Islamabad 
23.11.2023
“APPROVED FOR REPORTING”
Rashid /Agha M. Furqan
 
6 Section 490.1(3) of Criminal Code, R.S.C, c.C-46 (Canada), 
 1985,
 Section 303s of Proceeds of Crime Act (UK), 2002,
 Rule 32.2 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (United States of 
America), and 
Section 142(5) of Confiscation Act (Australia), 1997.
2024 SCP 181
C.A.277/2014
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